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REVISITING THE LAW OF CONFIDENCE IN SINGAPORE 
AND A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW TORT OF MISUSE OF 
PRIVATE INFORMATION
This article critically examines the recent Court of Appeal 
decision in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting 
[2020] 1 SLR 1130 and its implications for the law of 
confidence. The article begins by setting out the decision at 
first instance, and then on appeal. It argues that the Court of 
Appeal’s “modified approach” fails to meaningfully engage 
the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest and places the law’s 
emphasis primarily, if not wholly, on the plaintiff ’s wrongful 
loss interest. The new framework also appears to have been 
influenced by English jurisprudence, which has had a long 
but unhelpful history of conflating the distinct concepts of 
“privacy” and “confidentiality”. To that end, it is submitted 
that the “modified approach” can play a more meaningful 
role in the context of a new common law cause of action to be 
known as the tort of “misuse of private information”. In so far 
as disputes involving commercial confidences are concerned, 
the traditional three-stage test for the breach of confidence 
action famously laid down in Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd 
[1969] RPC 41 should be retained, albeit in a modified form.
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The secret is of value only so long as it remains a secret.[2]
I. Introduction
1 As much as the circuit breaker which the Government 
implemented on 7 April 2020 was unprecedented with numerous far-
reaching consequences, the same can arguably be said of I-Admin 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting3 (“I-Admin (CA)”) – a decision 
of the Court of Appeal delivered just a day earlier – in relation to the 
authors’ understanding and the future application of the law of confidence 
in Singapore. I-Admin (CA) unquestionably marked a watershed for 
Singapore as the decision significantly modified the analytical framework 
and test which had hitherto been employed to establish the equitable 
action for breach of confidence.4 In essence, the “modified approach” in 
the court’s judgment5 introduced a legal presumption in favour of the 
plaintiff but, in the process, also jettisoned the need for the plaintiff to 
prove the third requirement6 embodied in Megarry J’s oft-cited test in 
Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd7 (“Coco”), a decision which has been 
cited with glowing approval by the Singapore courts for very many years.8
2 In an action for breach of confidence, the plaintiff – pursuant 
to the traditional Coco formulation – must establish three elements: 
(a) the information concerned is confidential in nature; (b) it was 
imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and 
2 Microbiological Research Corp v Muna 625 P 2d 690 at 696 (Utah, 1981), 
per  Maughan  CJ. Contrariwise, “[t]he secret, as a secret, had ceased to exist”: 
O Mustad & Son v Dosen [1964] 1 WLR 109 at 111, per Lord Buckmaster.
3 [2020] 1 SLR 1130.
4 As a caveat, the reader should note that the focus of this article is on the common law 
action for breach of confidence that is rooted in equity. Breaches of confidentiality 
between parties to a contract and arising from express contractual provisions that 
stipulate the parties’ confidentiality obligations are therefore beyond the scope of 
discussion.
5 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
6 Ie, “there must be an unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of the 
person communicating it”: see Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 
at 48.
7 [1969] RPC 41 at 47.
8 See, eg, X Pte Ltd v CDE [1992] 2 SLR(R) 575 at [27]; Stratech Systems Ltd v Guthrie 
Properties (S) Pte Ltd [2001] SGHC 77 at [33]; Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd v Obegi 
Melissa [2006] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [34]; QB Net Co Ltd  v  Earnson Management (S) 
Pte Ltd [2007] 1 SLR(R) 1 at [65]; PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Intrepid 
Offshore Construction Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 36 at [55]; Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v 
JCS Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1045 at [129]; Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong 
Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [64]; ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 at [17]; Adinop Co Ltd v 
Rovithai Ltd [2018] SGHC 129 at [54]; [2019] 2 SLR 808 (CA) at [41]; and LVM Law 
Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [15].
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(c)  unauthorised use was made of that information to the detriment 
of the plaintiff. Following I-Admin (CA), however, a plaintiff is now 
only required to prove the first two elements of the action, whereupon 
a breach of confidence is presumed and the defendant, in turn, bears the 
burden of showing that his conscience has not been affected. To say that 
the Rubicon has been crossed might therefore be no understatement. 
Indeed, to some segments of society, the decision in I-Admin (CA) is to 
be warmly welcomed since it reflects a marked shift towards the legal 
protection of confidences, particularly in an age where information 
can easily be abused, copied and exploited en masse.9 Nevertheless, for 
reasons which will become clear later, the authors are of the view that the 
law of confidence in Singapore remains in a state of flux. It is also the case 
that I-Admin (CA) itself, with respect, raises several questions of its own 
that call for greater sensitivity in their treatment by the courts.
3 The objectives of this article are relatively straightforward. 
Although the authors have set out in the first instance to critically examine 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in I-Admin, this article is much 
more than just a comment on that decision. It aims to unravel the various 
doctrinal difficulties and uncertainties inherent in the “old fashioned”10 
cause of action for breach of confidence – by, inter alia, (a) transporting 
the reader back to the roots of the action;11 (b) understanding the two 
distinct, but related, interests (namely, “privacy” and “confidentiality”) 
that the action is capable of protecting and the various limitations 
and inadequacies of the action in trying to protect privacy interests 
in information; as well as (c) proposing a modification of the third 
requirement in the Coco framework.
4 More importantly, the authors take this opportunity to sound 
the clarion call for a new common law action in Singapore (existing 
alongside, but operating independently of, the traditional cause of action 
for breach of confidence) to more effectively safeguard the individual’s 
informational privacy in the modern world – through the proposed tort 
for “misuse of private information”. A bifurcated approach can then be 
adopted, with Coco (albeit modified) applying to cases where commercial 
confidences are concerned and the new tort applying to cases involving 
private or personal information. The discussion, however, first begins with 
9 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [3].
10 See Paul Stanley, The Law of Confidentiality: A Restatement (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
at p 6.
11 The law of confidence has been developed by the Courts of Chancery from at least 
the 18th century. For a historical survey of English case law that traces the evolution 
of the law of confidence, see Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 
2 WLR 592 at [54] ff as well as I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 
1 SLR 1130 at [46] ff.
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an outline of the background facts and the judgments of the High Court 
and Court of Appeal in I-Admin.
II. Background facts and judgments of the High Court and 
Court of Appeal in I-Admin
5 The facts are as follows. The plaintiff, I-Admin (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd (“I-Admin”), is a Singapore-incorporated company in the business 
of providing outsourcing services and systems software, primarily in the 
areas of payroll and human resource management.12 The first defendant, 
Hong, was previously employed by the plaintiff, while the second and 
fifth defendants, Liu and Tan, were previously employed by the plaintiff ’s 
subsidiaries.13 All three defendants resigned within the space of 
two months,14 after which they started working for the third defendant, 
Nice Payroll Pte Ltd (“Nice Payroll”), a Singapore-incorporated company 
that was also in the business of providing similar services.15 Nice Payroll 
was formed earlier (in 2011) by Hong, together with the fourth defendant, 
Li. An agreement was also reached whereby Li, Liu and Hong would 
share equal ownership of the company.16
6 In 2013, however, I-Admin discovered the existence of Nice 
Payroll, including the fact that Hong and Liu were the directors of the 
company.17 I-Admin then sought and obtained an Anton Piller order 
against the defendants, pursuant to which certain materials belonging to 
I-Admin were found on Nice Payroll’s premises.18 I-Admin then sued the 
defendants for copyright infringement, breach of confidence, conspiracy, 
breach of contract and inducement thereof.19 For present purposes, the 
authors will only focus on the parts of the case pertaining to the law of 
confidence. It was argued, in relation to the claim for breach of confidence, 
that the breach manifested itself in four instances, namely:
(a) the defendants’ reproduction of I-Admin’s confidential 
material;
(b) the use of I-Admin’s source codes and databases to 
generate Nice Payroll’s payroll reports;
12 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [3].
13 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [7]–[9].
14 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [12].
15 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [4].
16 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [11].
17 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [13].
18 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [14].
19 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [17]–[21].
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(c) Hong’s access to and use of I-Admin’s demonstration 
platform; and
(d) Hong’s disclosure to I-Admin’s clients (HSBC Bank Ltd 
and ADP International Services BV) that their client data was in 
Nice Payroll’s possession.20
A. The High Court judgment
7 At first instance, Aedit Abdullah J in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd v Hong Ying Ting21 (“I-Admin (HC)”) substantially found in favour 
of the defendants, except for a claim involving breach of contract.22 In 
particular, where copyright infringement was concerned, the court found 
that substantial copying was not proved in relation to the plaintiff ’s source 
codes, databases and other materials.23
8 The claims for breach of confidence also failed for several reasons. 
First, with respect to the argument that the defendants had reproduced, 
copied, adapted and/or referenced I-Admin’s materials24 in developing 
Nice Payroll’s products, the court held that it was not proved that any 
copying or reproduction had occurred.25 In any event, it was found that 
mere copying alone “[could] not amount to actual use”26 for the purposes 
of establishing unauthorised use. In reaching this conclusion, Abdullah J 
distinguished the earlier decision of the High Court in Clearlab SG Pte 
Ltd v Ting Chong Chai27 (“Clearlab”). I-Admin ultimately failed to show 
that the defendants had in fact used its confidential materials when 
developing their own products.28
9 Second, with respect to the claim that the defendants had used 
I-Admin’s payroll software to generate Nice Payroll’s internal payroll 
reports,29 the court found that it was unlikely that the defendants had 
actually installed and utilised the plaintiff ’s software simply to process 
internal payroll reports when less taxing alternatives were available to 
them. More crucially, however, there was no forensic evidence to show 
actual use – that the plaintiff ’s software had actually been run.30 The same 
20 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [18].
21 [2020] 3 SLR 615.
22 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [140] and [172].
23 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [106].
24 These were the source codes, systems, database structures and client materials.
25 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [116].
26 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [117].
27 [2015] 1 SLR 163.
28 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [123].
29 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [126].
30 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [129].
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defect plagued I-Admin’s third claim that Hong had accessed and utilised 
confidential information hosted on the plaintiff ’s online demonstration 
platform. While forensic evidence showed that a file was downloaded 
from the server,31 I-Admin could not give further details as to how the 
defendants had made unauthorised use of that particular file.32 Merely 
gaining access to the confidential information alone was insufficient to 
establish unauthorised use.33
10 Finally, in  so  far as I-Admin argued that the defendants had 
breached confidence by disclosing that they had confidential client data 
in possession, the court held that this merely confused the client data 
with the fact that such data was in the defendants’ possession. Although 
the defendants could not make use of the data, it did not follow that they 
could not also disclose the fact that they had come into possession of 
such data to the plaintiff ’s clients.34 As such, the fourth claim also failed.
B. The Court of Appeal judgment
11 On appeal, the apex court agreed that I-Admin’s claim for 
copyright infringement had been correctly rejected.35
12 With respect to the claim for breach of confidence, the 
issue was whether the mere access to or possession or referencing 
of confidential  information would suffice to complete the action for 
breach of confidence.36 The court first noted that the Coco three-stage 
framework traditionally required a plaintiff to prove unauthorised use of 
information (including detriment). However, there were often situations 
where a defendant would wrongfully access or acquire confidential 
information without further using or disclosing the same.37 The present 
case was no different; there was indeed access and reference made to 
I-Admin’s materials. Such acts on the defendants’ part, in the court’s view, 
had undermined I-Admin’s desire “to maintain the confidentiality of its 
materials”.38
13 More pertinently, however, the Court of Appeal queried whether 
the existing law of confidence was sufficiently broad to encompass the 
myriad of ways in which the confidentiality of information could be 
31 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [131].
32 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [134].
33 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [134].
34 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [137].
35 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [42].
36 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [44].
37 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [43].
38 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [44].
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undermined.39 The court opined that there were three factors to consider: 
namely (a) the interests protected by breach of confidence; (b) the nature 
of the threat to those interests; and (c) the remedies available when such 
interests were infringed.40
14 Addressing the first factor, the Court of Appeal found that 
the requirement of unauthorised use and consequential detriment to 
the plaintiff pointed to the protection of a specific interest, namely the 
plaintiff ’s “interest in preventing wrongful gain or profit from [the] 
confidential information” (“wrongful gain interest”).41 However, the 
court noted that the earlier English authorities concerning breach of 
confidence had omitted any mention of detriment, thereby suggesting 
that the policy objectives behind confidence could have extended 
beyond protecting the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest.42 Citing Smith 
Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of 
Community Services and Health43 (“Smith Kline”) for the proposition 
that the obligation of confidence was not merely “to refrain from 
causing detriment” but to also “respect the confidence [of the relevant 
information]”,44 the Court of Appeal further concluded that there was 
a second distinct interest protected by the law of confidence, namely the 
plaintiff ’s “interest to avoid wrongful loss” (“wrongful loss interest”).45 
This interest would be affected if the defendant’s conscience was impacted 
in the breach of the obligation of confidentiality,46 or more specifically, 
whenever there was “any kind of improper threat to the confidentiality”47 
of the relevant information.
15 In addressing the second and third factors, the Court of 
Appeal found that “a more robust response”48 was needed to protect 
a plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest. First, given the huge advances in 
modern technology, it was now “significantly”49 easier to access, copy 
and disseminate vast amounts of confidential information. In the 
present case, although it was not proven that the defendants had directly 
profited from their access to and referencing of the plaintiff ’s materials, 
the fact remained that they had “knowingly acquired and circulated”50 
39 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [45].
40 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [45].
41 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [50].
42 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [50].
43 (1990) 17 IPR 545 at 584.
44 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [51].
45 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [53].
46 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [53].
47 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [51] and [59].
48 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [54] and [58].
49 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55].
50 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [54].
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those materials without consent. This represented a “significant” and 
“unchecked” threat to the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest.51 Second, mere 
infringement of the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest (or the dissipation 
of the information’s confidential character) did not always immediately 
translate into monetary terms or quantifiable detriment. This meant that 
even a simple claim for damages would not necessarily succeed for such 
infringements.52
16 Accordingly, a “modified approach” for breach of confidence 
claims was adopted. The first two Coco requirements have been preserved 
under the new framework, with the third discarded. Henceforth, in any 
action for breach of confidence, the court will only consider whether:53
… the information in question ‘has the necessary quality of confidence about 
it’ and if it has been ‘imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of 
confidence’. An obligation of confidence will also be found where confidential 
information has been accessed or acquired without a plaintiff ’s knowledge 
or consent. Upon the satisfaction of these prerequisites, an action for breach 
of confidence is presumed. This might be displaced where, for instance, the 
defendant came across the information by accident or was unaware of its 
confidential nature or believed there to be a strong public interest in disclosing 
it. Whatever the explanation, the burden will be on the defendant to prove that 
its conscience was unaffected [emphasis added].
The Court of Appeal observed that the modified approach would place 
greater emphasis on the wrongful loss interest without undermining 
the protection of the wrongful gain interest.54 The shift in the burden of 
proof was based on the notion that a putative defendant would be better 
positioned to account for any suspected wrongdoing as compared to 
owners of confidential information. Such owners, the court reasoned, 
would often be unaware of any breach of confidence, and thus face 
“practical”55 and evidentiary difficulties in bringing claims of this nature. 
Finally, the court took the view that the new approach would also be in 
line with that taken in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, such as in the 
decision of Imerman v Tchenguiz56 (“Imerman”) where the English Court 
of Appeal held that the very act of “looking at” documents could in itself 
be a breach of confidence.57
51 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55].
52 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [57].
53 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
54 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
55 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [62].
56 Imerman v Tchenquiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [68].
57 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [59].
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17 Applying the modified approach, the Court of Appeal held 
that the defendants were liable for breach. First, it was undisputed that 
I-Admin’s materials were confidential in nature. Second, the defendants 
were under an obligation to preserve the confidentiality of the materials. 
In turn, this obligation of confidence was prima facie breached 
when the defendants acquired, circulated and referenced I-Admin’s 
materials without permission.58 No evidence was proffered to displace 
the rebuttable presumption that the defendants’ conscience had been 
negatively affected. Unsurprisingly, the court held that the defendants’ 
possession and referencing of the plaintiff ’s confidential materials were 
sufficient to constitute acts in breach of confidence.59 The same analysis 
applied to Hong’s downloading of files from I-Admin’s online server; that 
too, in conjunction with the use of confidential login details, was a breach 
of confidence.60 Finally, the defendants’ mere possession of client data 
was also found to constitute a breach.61
18 Turning to the question of remedies, the court held that neither 
an injunction nor an order for delivery up of confidential information 
was appropriate as any benefit from the referencing of I-Admin’s 
materials had presumably been extracted.62 As such, equitable damages 
were awarded instead, with the precise measure being left to the lower 
court to determine.63
III. Revisiting the law of confidence and critique of I-Admin (CA)
19 Before examining the I-Admin (CA) decision in any detail, the 
authors would like to briefly address one specific aspect of the case. In 
the context of erstwhile employer–employee relationships, it is important 
to bear in mind the need for the law to strike an appropriate balance 
between two competing policy concerns.64 On the one hand, the law seeks 
to protect trade secrets and other commercially valuable confidential 
information belonging to the employer. This objective is particularly 
pertinent in today’s context as technological advances would have 
rendered confidential information increasingly fragile.65 On a broader 
scale, it is also important to provide the certainty and security necessary 
for individuals and entities to engage in research and development 
58 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [63].
59 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [64].
60 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [65].
61 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [66].
62 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [69]–[70].
63 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [79].
64 See Tang Siew Choy v Certact Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR(R) 835 at [2] and [34].
65 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55].
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in the commercial world.66 Yet, on the other hand, the law must be 
careful not to unreasonably inhibit competition in the marketplace.67 
Ex-employees should be allowed to make full use of the knowledge, skills 
and experience they have gained from their previous employment to 
contribute meaningfully to their new jobs.68 This would ensure a higher 
degree of labour mobility within the industry, which in turn promotes 
healthy and productive competition to fuel innovation and growth.69
20 A brief survey of the jurisprudence in this area reveals that, in 
the absence of express covenants, the law has sought to achieve the right 
balance by limiting the scope of the obligation of confidence imposed upon 
ex-employees to only trade secrets or their equivalent.70 In other words, 
only highly confidential information belonging to the ex-employer will be 
protected post-employment.71 This approach has generally required the 
courts to judiciously examine whether each piece of information alleged 
to be confidential embodies a sufficiently high degree of confidentiality 
as to amount to a trade secret.72
21 While the courts in I-Admin (HC) and I-Admin (CA) did recognise 
the importance of protecting confidential information belonging to the 
former employer,73 it appears, with respect, that a careful consideration of 
the countervailing interests of the former employees featured much less 
prominently in the analyses.74 In the authors’ respectful view, it might 
be prudent for the courts, going forward, to exercise greater sensitivity 
to the nuances and policy concerns which underlie the narrower scope 
of the obligation of confidence that is imposed upon former employees. 
66 See MVF3 APS v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] UKSC 31; [2013] RPC 33 at [44].
67 See Tang Siew Choy v Certact Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR(R) 835 at [34].
68 See Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724 at 731.
69 See Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence – The Protection of Confidential 
Information (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2012) at paras 12.07, 12.08 and 
12.178.
70 See, eg, Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724 at 731; Tang Siew Choy v 
Certact Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR(R) 835 at [16]–[17].
71 See Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724 at 731. See also Tanya Aplin 
et  al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence – The Protection of Confidential Information 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2012) at para 12.173.
72 In carrying out this assessment, the courts have developed several guidelines: see, 
eg, Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] 1 Ch 117 at 137–138; Force India Formula 
One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2012] EWHC 616 (Ch); [2012] 
RPC 29 at [237]–[238].
73 See, eg, I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55] and 
[62].
74 See, eg, I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [163] 
where, in the context of the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means, Aedit Abdullah J 
briefly recognised the reality for most employees to explore further opportunities for 
themselves post-employment.
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A detailed consideration of this specific segment of the law of confidence 
is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article but the authors do 
intend to undertake this exercise on a future occasion.
A. The Court of Appeal’s “modified approach”: Two preliminary 
observations
22 Two preliminary observations will first be made about the 
modified approach laid down by the Court of Appeal in I-Admin.75 The 
first concerns the shifting of the burden of proof onto the defendant 
upon the satisfaction of the first two Coco requirements and the raising 
of a  presumption of breach of confidence in the plaintiff ’s favour. In 
particular, does the modified approach involve a shift of the legal or 
evidential burden of proof? Second, if it is the legal burden of proof 
that shifts, under what circumstances can a defendant displace the 
presumption and discharge this burden?
23 It may be helpful, at the outset, to lay out the differences between 
the legal burden of proof and the evidential burden of proof. This issue 
was carefully addressed by the Court of Appeal in Britestone Pte Ltd v 
Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd76 (“Britestone”) where the court said:77
The term ‘burden of proof ’ is more properly used with reference to the 
obligation to prove. There are in fact two kinds of burden in relation to the 
adduction of evidence. The first, designated the legal burden of proof, is, 
properly speaking, a burden of proof, for it describes the obligation to persuade 
the trier of fact that, in view of the evidence, the fact in dispute exists. This 
obligation never shifts in respect of any fact, and only ‘shifts’ in a manner of 
loose terminology when a legal presumption operates. The second is a burden 
of proof only loosely speaking, for it falls short of an obligation to prove that 
a particular fact exists. It is more accurately designated the evidential burden 
to produce evidence since, whenever it operates, the failure to adduce some 
evidence, whether in propounding or rebutting, will mean a failure to engage 
the question of the existence of a particular fact or to keep this question alive. 
As such, this burden can and will shift.
In other words, the legal burden of proof refers to the obligation to 
convince the court – on a balance of probabilities in all civil claims – that 
a particular fact or issue is made out. This burden lies with the party 
who affirms the fact or issue in question, and not the party denying it.78 
The legal burden has also been described as a permanent and enduring 
75 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
76 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855.
77 Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [58].
78 This is based upon the general rule ei qui affirmat non ei equi negat incumbit probatio 
(ie, proof rests on he who affirms, not he who denies). See Constantine Line  v 
(cont’d on the next page)
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burden which does not shift.79 As such, the legal burden always rests 
on the plaintiff.80 Even where a legal presumption operates, it would 
be largely inaccurate to describe the legal burden as having shifted to 
the defendant. Instead, the better view is that a separate issue has been 
engaged, for which the opposite party now bears the legal burden of 
proof.81
24 On the other hand, the evidential burden of proof has been 
described as “the tactical onus to contradict, weaken or explain away the 
evidence that has been led”.82 This burden typically falls on the plaintiff at 
the start of his case to adduce evidence in support of his assertion(s) that 
a fact or issue is made out.83 Upon the adduction of sufficient evidence 
to raise the inference that the fact or issue is made out, the evidential 
burden then shifts to the defendant to adduce evidence in rebuttal.84 The 
defendant may discharge this burden by adducing further evidence of his 
own, in which case the evidential burden shifts back to the plaintiff. The 
evidential burden of proof will therefore shift back and forth between the 
plaintiff and defendant in the course of the proceedings until one party 
fails to discharge this burden. If it is the defendant who ultimately fails 
to satisfy the evidential burden, then the law regards the legal burden 
of proof in establishing the fact or issue in question as having been 
discharged by the plaintiff.85
25 Having outlined the distinction between the legal and evidential 
burdens of proof, the discussion returns to the modified approach in 
I-Admin (CA). The Court of Appeal did not expressly indicate whether 
the burden which shifts to the defendant to prove that his conscience was 
unaffected (and thereby displace the presumption) was a legal burden or 
an evidential one. It was also not explicitly stated if the presumption of 
“an action for breach of confidence”,86 which arises upon the plaintiff ’s 
satisfaction of the first two Coco requirements, refers to a legal presumption 
Imperial Smelting Corp [1942] AC 154 at 174 and Lee Tso Fong v Kwok Wai Sun 
[2008] 4 HKC 36 at [22].
79 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [60].
80 See Cristian Priwisata Yacob v Wibowo Boediono [2017] SGHC 8 at [23].
81 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [60].
82 Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [59].
83 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [60].
84 See Norbrook Laboratories Ltd v Bomac Laboratories Ltd [2006] UKPC 25 at [31] and 
Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1214 at [3].
85 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [60].
86 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
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or an evidential presumption (although, in the authors’ view, it is likely to 
be the former).87
26 At first blush, it seems that the Court of Appeal intended for 
a shift of the legal burden of proof to the defendant. First, as set out in 
Britestone, the term “burden of proof ” has been recognised as more 
accurately, and commonly, describing the legal burden of proof.88 This 
is supported by the fact that the term “proof ”, where it appears in the 
Evidence Act,89 refers to the legal burden of proof.90 Second, the language 
employed by the Court of Appeal in I-Admin, namely that the burden 
is on the defendant “to prove that [his] conscience was unaffected”,91 
hints at a more stringent obligation to persuade the court of this fact 
and also suggests that an issue separate from proof of the first two Coco 
requirements has now been engaged.92 This therefore points away from 
any indication of a mere “tactical onus” on the defendant to adduce 
evidence to “contradict, weaken or explain away the evidence that has 
been led” by the plaintiff.93
27 With this in mind, the authors will proceed to consider, as the 
second preliminary observation, the three specific instances provided by 
the Court of Appeal through which the court said this burden placed upon 
the defendant may be discharged.94 These examples will be addressed in 
turn. From the analysis below, it remains unclear (a) whether the court 
was actually referring to a shift of the legal or evidential burden of proof; 
and (b) under which of the enumerated circumstances (apart from the 
third) can a defendant successfully discharge this burden.
28 The first example provided concerns a defendant who came 
across the plaintiff ’s confidential information by accident. With respect, it 
is somewhat puzzling how the coming across of confidential information 
by accident can, in itself, be sufficient to displace the presumption that 
a breach of confidence has occurred. According to conventional wisdom, 
the equitable action for breach of confidence no longer distinguishes 
between the different ways in which a defendant may come across 
87 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [58], 
which affirms the existence of legal presumptions. Cf Lee Tso Fong v Kwok Wai Sun 
[2008] 4 HKC 36 at [22] which states that presumptions are rules of evidence.
88 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [58]. 
See also Brady v Group Lotus Car Companies plc (1987) 60 TC 359 at 376–377, which 
referred to the legal burden of proof as the “basic burden of proof ”.
89 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed.
90 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [59].
91 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
92 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [60].
93 Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [59].
94 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
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confidential information for the purposes of imposing the obligation 
of confidence upon him, thereby binding his conscience. This is clearly 
illustrated in Lord Goff ’s oft-cited speech in Attorney-General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No 2).95 In that decision, Lord Goff recognised that 
a  duty of confidence may distinctly arise with respect to direct and 
indirect recipients of confidential information as well as adventitious 
finders who come upon confidential information by accident.96 More 
pertinently, in relation to the latter, Lord Goff observed that a duty of 
confidence arises when “an obviously confidential document is wafted 
by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded street, or where an 
obviously confidential document, such as a private diary, is dropped in 
a public place, and is then picked up by a passer-by”.97 Clearly, the critical 
factor which determines whether or not a duty of confidence arises is not 
the manner in which the defendant comes upon the information, but 
rather the knowledge possessed by the defendant that the information 
in question is confidential. Thus, if the defendant possesses actual or 
constructive knowledge of, or is wilfully blind to, the confidentiality 
of the information, an obligation of confidence will certainly bind his 
conscience in equity.98 It cannot therefore be the case that a defendant 
who simply comes across confidential information by accident is 
capable, by this fact alone, of displacing the presumption that a breach 
of confidence has occurred. It is respectfully submitted that regardless 
of how the defendant came into possession of the information, it is still 
necessary to consider whether the defendant did possess the requisite 
knowledge of the confidentiality of the information concerned.
29 This leads nicely to the second example provided by the Court 
of Appeal which involves a situation where the defendant was unaware 
of the confidential nature of the information. As explained above,99 the 
absence of the requisite knowledge of the information’s confidential 
nature should rightly leave the defendant’s conscience unaffected in 
equity since the obligation of confidence should not be imposed on him 
under such circumstances.100 Curiously, in respect of the second example, 
why should the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the confidentiality of the 
information concerned be at all relevant in displacing the presumption? 
95 [1990] 1 AC 109.
96 See Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281.
97 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281.
98 See, eg, Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2012] 
EWHC 616 (Ch); [2012] RPC 29 at [224]; Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers 
Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281; Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] 
EWHC 634 at [48]; and Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 48.
99 See para 28 above.
100 See, eg, Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2012] 
EWHC 616 (Ch); [2012] RPC 29 at [224].
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Even assuming that the defendant was truly unaware of the confidential 
nature of the information, the only occasion when he can be expected to 
adduce evidence in support of this fact is during the court’s consideration 
of the second Coco requirement. It is noted, in this regard, that the legal 
burden of proof in establishing the second Coco requirement, namely that 
the information was imparted in circumstances importing an obligation 
of confidence, falls squarely on the plaintiff, under both the traditional 
Coco framework and the modified approach. As such, the defendant can 
only be expected to adduce evidence to show that he was unaware of the 
information’s confidential nature if, and when, the plaintiff has adduced 
sufficient evidence to raise an inference that the second Coco requirement 
has been made out. This then shifts the evidential burden of proof to the 
defendant,101 whereupon the absence of knowledge would be sufficient 
to satisfy the defendant’s evidential burden and result in a failure by the 
plaintiff to discharge his legal burden of proof in establishing the second 
Coco requirement on a balance of probabilities.102
30 Following the above analysis, the authors wish to point out that the 
discharge of the defendant’s evidential burden vis-à-vis the second Coco 
requirement must logically occur prior to the raising of the presumption 
under the modified approach.103 In fact, if the defendant can successfully 
discharge his evidential burden for the second Coco requirement (which 
he is very likely to if he were to be unaware of the confidentiality of the 
information), then the said presumption should not even be raised at 
all in the first instance. In other words, there would be no shifting of 
the legal burden to the defendant where the plaintiff, in the discharge 
of his legal burden, is unable to successfully establish the second Coco 
requirement. The authors therefore take the view that the defendant’s lack 
of knowledge of the confidential nature of the information concerned 
appears better suited to the discharge of the defendant’s evidential burden 
of proof vis-à-vis the second Coco requirement, rather than to have any 
bearing whatsoever on the defendant’s attempts at displacing the said 
presumption. Accordingly, the authors do not, with respect, share the 
court’s view that the presumption of a breach of confidence (already 
raised in favour of the plaintiff) can be displaced where the defendant 
was unaware of the confidentiality of the information in question.
101 See Norbrook Laboratories Ltd v Bomac Laboratories [2006] UKPC 25 at [31] and 
Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1214 at [3].
102 See Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2012] 
EWHC 616 (Ch); [2012] RPC 29 at [224] and Attorney-General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281.
103 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
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31 Turning now to the third example with which the authors 
respectfully agree, the presumption of a breach of confidence might 
well be displaced where the defendant believed that there was a strong 
public interest in disclosing the information. In the authors’ view, 
this provides a useful example of how a defendant may successfully 
discharge his burden of proof in displacing the presumption. After all, 
the public interest defence is a familiar exception to liability in the law of 
confidence104 where the need to balance the public interest in preserving 
and protecting confidences against any countervailing public interest in 
favour of disclosure is very well established.105
32 The allusion to a public interest defence as illustrative of how 
a defendant may rebut the presumption of a breach of confidence also 
suggests that the burden which has since shifted to the defendant must 
refer to the legal burden of proof. This would be consistent with the 
traditional understanding that the legal burden of proving a defence 
rests solely on the proponent of the defence.106 Also, unlike the scenario 
featured in the second example above, a public interest defence should, in 
law, be treated as a separate issue engaged and asserted by the defendant, 
on whom the legal burden now rests.107
33 Apart from the three examples provided by the Court of Appeal, 
there is a possibility of a fourth on account of the recent decision of the 
High Court in iVenture Card Ltd v Big Bus Singapore Sightseeing Pte Ltd108 
(“iVenture”), which was decided after I-Admin (CA). Choo Han Teck J 
in iVenture, by recognising that the three-limb test in Coco “had been 
approved in its entirety (until very recently) by the courts in Singapore”,109 
must be taken to have alluded to the modified approach laid down by the 
Court of Appeal in I-Admin. On the facts, his Honour concluded that 
even if the first two Coco requirements were made out, the defendants 
had not misused the plaintiff ’s confidential information or “acted 
unconscionably in any other way” as the defendants’ competing product 
was found to have been independently developed.110 This, in the authors’ 
view, hints at the possibility that the absence of any misuse of confidential 
104 See Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526 at 544, 546 and 550 and Francome v 
Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 892 at 899.
105 See Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 282 
(in particular, Lord Goff ’s “third limiting principle” stipulated therein).
106 See Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA, Singapore Branch v 
Motorola Electronics Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 63 at [31]; iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan 
Swee Leon [2016] 3 SLR 663 at [61]; and Currie v Dempsey [1967] 2  NSWR  532 
at 539.
107 Cf Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 at [60].
108 [2020] SGHC 109.
109 iVenture Card Ltd v Big Bus Singapore Sightseeing Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 109 at [26].
110 iVenture Card Ltd v Big Bus Singapore Sightseeing Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 109 at [27].
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information by the defendant may well constitute probative evidence 
that the defendant’s conscience has not been affected and be sufficient 
to enable the defendant to displace the prima facie presumption. If this 
proposition is accepted, then arguably, the introduction and impact of the 
modified approach would simply be to reverse the legal burden of proof 
at the third stage of the Coco framework – from the plaintiff (to prove 
misuse) to the defendant (to disprove misuse after the presumption has 
been raised). Such an interpretation of Choo J’s decision, which in the 
authors’ view is not entirely implausible, may in fact be bolstered by the 
Court of Appeal’s expressed concern of plaintiffs having to overcome the 
“evidential back-foot” which they used to encounter when establishing 
the third Coco requirement under the old framework.111
34 Be that as it may, the authors recognise that the outcome of the 
appeal in I-Admin – to the effect that the duty of confidence imposed on 
the defendants (who were found on the facts to have only possessed and 
referenced the plaintiff ’s confidential information)112 may extend beyond 
their refraining from acts of unauthorised use or disclosure113 – means 
that the absence of misuse, in and of itself, is insufficient to discharge the 
defendants’ legal burden of proof in displacing the presumption. It may, 
however, be contemplated that the reasoning in I-Admin (CA) should 
really be confined to the specific facts of that decision, concerned as it 
was with surreptitious takers of confidential information.114 Perhaps in 
alternative scenarios involving mere recipients or accidental finders of 
information (whose conduct is less likely to amount to “wrongdoing”), 
a court might come to the view that the absence of misuse may well be 
sufficient to establish that a defendant’s conscience was unaffected in 
equity. Despite this, the authors would respectfully disagree with such an 
approach – namely, that it is for the defendant to bear the legal burden of 
disproving misuse. In the authors’ respectful view, as a matter of equity 
and fairness and also for other reasons which will be elaborated upon 
below, the legal burden of proof ought to rest squarely on the plaintiff to 
satisfy the third Coco requirement of misuse (albeit in a modified fashion, 
a proposal to which the authors shall return later in this article).115
111 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [62].
112 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [64].
113 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [51].
114 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55] 
and [63]–[64].
115 See paras 101–118 below.
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35 In summary, while it appears that the modified approach in 
I-Admin (CA) involves a shifting of the legal burden of proof after the 
presumption of breach of confidence is triggered, the second example 
given by the court curiously hints at the need for the defendant to satisfy 
an evidential burden of proof, rather than a legal one (albeit at a different 
stage of the analysis). In addition, it is not entirely clear in which of the 
scenarios provided by the Court of Appeal (except the third) would 
a defendant be able to discharge his burden of proof and displace the 
presumption – given that the first example on its own is ambivalent and 
the circumstances inherent in the second example have the likely effect 
of preventing the legal burden from shifting to the defendant (since the 
presumption in favour of the plaintiff should not even be triggered in the 
first instance). Finally, the authors are of the view that the recent decision 
of the High Court in iVenture has raised the further question whether the 
absence of misuse of confidential information, particularly in cases where 
the defendant did not come upon the information through clandestine 
or underhanded means, may be sufficient to enable him to displace the 
presumption. It is hoped that further judicial clarification and guidance 
on all these matters will be forthcoming.
B. “Wrongful gain interest” versus “Wrongful loss interest” under 
the “modified approach”
36 The Court of Appeal stated at the outset of its judgment 
that because the current framework for the law of confidence did not 
“adequately safeguard the interests of those who own confidential 
information”, it was timely to review the scope of the action for breach 
of confidence, particularly in light of the challenges faced in protecting 
such information against misuse in a digitised society.116 In determining 
whether a “modern approach” should be implemented for the breach 
of confidence framework in Singapore, the court thought it relevant to 
ask, inter alia, what “interests” were sought to be protected by this cause 
of action.117 It was in this context that the Court of Appeal introduced 
two types of interests – namely, “wrongful gain interest” and “wrongful 
loss interest” – which, as far as the authors can tell, appear to be original 
catchphrases aptly coined by the court.
116 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [3].
117 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [45].
© 2020 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 Revisiting the Law of Confidence in Singapore and a Proposal for a  
(2020) 32 SAcLJ New Tort of Misuse of Private Information 909
(1) Wrongful gain interest
37 Drawing on dicta in Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell 
Engineering Co Ltd,118 Seager v Copydex Ltd119 and Coco,120 it seemed clear 
to the Court of Appeal – from the judicial language of taking “unfair 
advantage” of information received in confidence and the requirement of 
unauthorised “use” and consequential “detriment” (or “prejudice”) – that 
the equitable action for breach of confidence is, in this regard, envisaged 
to protect a plaintiff ’s interest in “preventing wrongful gain or profit 
from [the] confidential information”, otherwise known as the plaintiff ’s 
“wrongful gain interest”.121
38 This observation is hardly surprising and indeed uncontroversial 
as the aforementioned cases were all set in the commercial context and 
concerned with commercially valuable information (or information 
of a “commercially exploitable character”),122 such as trade secrets and 
secret processes of manufacture. Therefore, when mention is made of 
safeguarding a plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest, it makes eminent sense 
for a court to have regard to the conduct of the defendant. This is where 
the defendant, who is in prior possession of the plaintiff ’s confidential 
information (whether in the shoes of a recipient or surreptitious taker), is 
shown to have taken unfair advantage of such information and wrongfully 
gained (or profited) at the plaintiff ’s expense.123 It follows that in so far as 
the wrongful gain interest is concerned, there must also be evidence of 
118 (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 213: so long as a defendant uses “confidential information 
directly or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff, without [their express or implied 
consent], he will be guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff ’s rights”.
119 [1967] 1 WLR 923 at 931: “[t]he law on this subject … depends on the broad 
principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take 
unfair advantage of it. He must not make use of it to the prejudice of him who gave it 
without obtaining his consent” [emphasis added].
120 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 48: “there must be an unauthorised 
use of the information to the detriment of the person communicating it” [emphasis 
added].
121 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [50]; see also 
para 14 above. For further examples in the case law which have engaged the plaintiff ’s 
wrongful gain interest, see Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER 492; Terrapin Ltd v Builders’ 
Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375; OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; Clearlab SG 
Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163; Adinop Co Ltd v Rovithai Ltd [2019] 
2 SLR 808.
122 This formulation appears in the English Law Commission’s report: Law Commission 
of England and Wales (Law Com No  110), Breach of Confidence: Report on a 
Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Cmnd 8388, 1981) 
at pp 80, 126, 133 and 153.
123 See, eg, Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 50 where Megarry J spoke 
of a “duty” – in cases involving “industry and commerce” – not to use confidential 
information “without paying a reasonable sum for it”.
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actual (or at least threatened)124 misuse on the defendant’s part125 which 
may, in turn, result in detriment or prejudice to the plaintiff (depending 
on the facts at hand). It bears repeating, however, that the main focus of 
this interest – which is akin to the notion of unjust enrichment – is on 
the conduct of the defendant who must be shown to have wrongfully 
benefited in some way at the plaintiff ’s expense, even if there is no direct 
evidence of economic harm or any prejudice suffered by the plaintiff.
39 Accordingly, when examined in this light, it is submitted that 
the proper protection of a plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest ought to 
be effected through the application and satisfaction of the third Coco 
requirement – namely, unauthorised use or disclosure (or the element 
of “misuse” for short). In the absence of any misuse by the defendant of 
the plaintiff ’s confidential information, it is difficult to ascertain how the 
plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest can be compromised.
(2) Wrongful loss interest
40 I-Admin (CA), however, identified a second, distinct interest that 
the breach of confidence action is capable of protecting – a  plaintiff ’s 
interest “to avoid wrongful loss (‘wrongful loss interest’), which is suffered 
so long as a defendant’s conscience has been impacted in the breach of 
the obligation of confidentiality”.126 Thus defined, it is understandable 
that when addressing the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest, the Court 
of Appeal was naturally influenced by judicial language – employed 
particularly in “the early law of confidence”127 – that hinged on the word 
“conscience”.128
124 It is submitted that the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest is broad enough to encompass 
not just instances of actual misuse by the defendant but to also include the notion 
of “threatened” misuse, which will be explained in greater detail at paras 105–110 
below.
125 Cf the “springboard” doctrine espoused in Terrapin Ltd v Builders’ Supply Co 
(Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375 at 391 which seeks to prevent a defendant from using 
the plaintiff ’s confidential information as a springboard to gain an unfair head-start 
over other trade competitors.
126 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [53].
127 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [50].
128 See, eg, Tipping v Clarke (1843) 2 Hare 383 at 393 (“the Court interposes to prevent 
a  positive wrong”); Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 41 ER 1171 (“Prince Albert”) 
at 1179 (“to prevent what this court considers and treats as a wrong … arising from 
a  … breach of … confidence”); Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER 492 at [255] (“the 
Court fastens the obligation on the conscience of the party”); Pollard v Photographic 
Co (1888) 40 Ch D 345 at 354 (“the Defendant is wholly in the wrong” and endorsing 
Prince Albert at 1179); Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd 
(1948) 65 RPC 203 at 211; Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd  v Philip Morris Ltd (1984) 
156 CLR 414 at 438; Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, 
Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 17 IPR 545 at 584 (“obligation 
(cont’d on the next page)
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41 Three observations are to be made in this regard. First, “the 
policy objectives behind the early law of confidence [that] may have 
extended beyond safeguarding against wrongful gain”129 to also include 
“wrongful loss” may plausibly be explained on the basis that a number 
of the early cases concerned the protection of information that was 
essentially private or personal in nature – for example, the proposed 
publication of a catalogue containing descriptions of (surreptitiously 
obtained) private etchings of the Royal Family130 and the unauthorised 
disclosure of a photograph bearing a lady’s likeness.131
42 In respect of the former example and in granting an injunction 
restraining publication because the defendant’s (unconscionable) 
conduct amounted to an unlawful invasion of the plaintiff ’s “privacy” 
rights, Knight Bruce VC observed that this was:132
… an unbecoming and unseemly intrusion … offensive to that inbred sense of 
propriety natural to every man – if intrusion, indeed, fitly describes a sordid 
spying into the privacy of domestic life – into the home (a word hitherto sacred 
among us), the home of a family whose life and conduct form an acknowledged 
title, though not their only unquestionable title, to the most marked respect in 
this country [emphasis added].
On appeal, Lord Cottenham LC also noted the “private character” of the 
plaintiff ’s etchings and that “[i]n the present case, where privacy is the 
right invaded, postponing the injunction would be equivalent to denying 
it altogether” [emphasis added].133
43 In the authors’ respectful view, it makes eminent sense to speak 
of “conscience” or for a court to have regard to the conscience of the 
defendant in addressing the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest – as did 
the Court of Appeal in I-Admin134 – where there is ample evidence of 
prejudice to the privacy (that is, beyond “confidentiality”) interests of the 
claimant. Indeed, the breach of confidence action in the early cases was 
precisely premised on the defendant’s conscience having been adversely 
affected by an equitable “wrong”135 and was used, in effect, to vindicate 
of conscience is to respect the confidence”). See also, generally, Attorney-General v 
Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 (where the word “conscience” was 
used fairly extensively).
129 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [50].
130 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 41 ER 1171. Cf, albeit of tangential relevance, Pope v 
Curl (1741) 26 ER 608.
131 Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch D 345.
132 See Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & SM 293 at 313.
133 See Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 41 ER 1171 at 1178–1179.
134 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [51].
135 See, eg, Tipping v Clarke (1843) 2 Hare 383 at 393; Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 
41 ER 1171 at 1179; Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch D 345 at 354.
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the plaintiff ’s “privacy” rights in what was essentially private/personal 
information.136 On the facts of Prince Albert v Strange,137 the defendant 
simply could not explain why he was improperly found in possession of 
the plaintiff ’s private etchings and this fact alone was sufficient to entitle 
the plaintiff to immediate injunctive relief.138 Megarry J in Coco appears, 
in obiter, to have also drawn a distinction between a stricter form of duty 
(which ought to apply to cases that concern private/personal information 
in particular and may also suggest that the courts are more wary of such 
information entering the public domain) and a less strict one (which 
ought to be applicable in the realm of industry and commerce):139
If the duty is a duty not to use the information without consent, then it may be 
the proper subject of an injunction restraining its use, even if there is an offer 
to pay a reasonable sum for that use. If, on the other hand, the duty is merely 
a duty not to use the information without paying a reasonable sum for it, then 
no such injunction should be granted. … [Here,] the essence of the duty seems 
more likely to be that of not using without paying, rather than of not using at 
all. It may be that in fields other than industry and commerce (and I have in 
mind the Argyll case)[140] the duty may exist in the more stringent form; but in 
the circumstances present in this case I think that the less stringent form is the 
more reasonable. [emphasis added]
44 From a general survey of the case law ever since the celebrated 
decision of Prince Albert v Strange, it would therefore appear that the 
law of confidence readily attaches the “obligation of conscience”141 on the 
defendant to prevent misuse of (especially) private/personal information 
– such as intimate, sensitive or embarrassing information.142 This is to 
136 See Lord Hoffmann in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [43] (in relation to 
Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & SM 293): “the equitable action for breach of 
confidence … has long been recognised as capable of being used to protect privacy”.
137 See Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 41 ER 1171 at 1179. Cf, by analogy, Imerman v 
Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592; and ANB v ANC [2015] 
5 SLR 522.
138 Indeed, Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & SM 293; (1849) 41 ER 1171 
was an early case that arguably stood as potential authority for the protection of 
“informational privacy”: see generally Samuel D Warren & Louis D Brandeis, “The 
Right of Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193.
139 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 50. See also A v B plc [2002] 
EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195 at [11(ii)].
140 Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch 302 – a case which involved confidential 
communications of private information between husband and wife during the 
currency of a marriage (ie, marital confidences).
141 Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 438; Smith 
Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community 
Services and Health (1990) 17 IPR 545 at 584.
142 See, eg, Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 41 ER 1171; Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 
40 Ch D 345; Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch 302; Francome v Mirror 
Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 892; Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449; X Pte 
Ltd v CDE [1992] 2 SLR(R) 575; Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 
(cont’d on the next page)
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more effectively safeguard the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest in the 
specific context of his privacy (and not merely his “confidentiality”) 
interests.
45 An analysis of the privacy-confidentiality dichotomy will be 
undertaken later in this article.143 Suffice to say, for present purposes, 
that a plaintiff arguably suffers wrongful loss – or a plaintiff ’s wrongful 
loss interest would arguably have been compromised – the moment 
information, particularly of a private/personal character, comes into the 
(unlawful) possession of the defendant, whether an indirect recipient or a 
surreptitious taker of information.
46 As regards the second observation, while it has been 
acknowledged in the preceding paragraphs that the breach of confidence 
action was historically used to safeguard a plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest 
in what was essentially private/personal information, it is apparent from 
a broad survey of the case law that the ambit of the action is not so 
confined and can also extend to protect a plaintiff against wrongful loss 
where the subject matter of the dispute pertains to commercially valuable 
information (or information of a commercially exploitable character).144 
This is where an appreciation of the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest 
is apposite. The wrongful loss interest within the breach of confidence 
framework simply refers to the plaintiff ’s interest to protect (or prevent) 
the information in question from losing its “confidential” character.145 
In other words, this specific interest serves to safeguard the plaintiff ’s 
“confidentiality” interests in the particularised information, which can 
obviously extend to both information encountered in the commercial 
context as well as to private/personal information.
1 WLR 804; Barrymore v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 600; A v B plc [2002] 
EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195; Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of Wales 
[2006] EWCA Civ 1776; [2007] 2 All ER 139; Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
[2008] EWHC 1777 (QB); White v Withers LLP [2009] EWCA Civ 1122; Imerman v 
Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592; ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522; 
ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611. See also George Wei, “Milky Way and 
Andromeda: Privacy, Confidentiality and Freedom of Expression” (2006) 18 SAcLJ 1 
(especially at 42–43, para 62).
143 See paras 57–76 below.
144 See, eg, Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER 492 at [255]; Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v 
Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 211; Smith Kline & French 
Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and 
Health (1990) 17 IPR 545 at 584; Adinop Co Ltd v Rovithai Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 808 
at [88]–[89].
145 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [51] (to protect 
plaintiffs from “improper [threats] to the confidentiality of their information”), [57] 
(“the wrongful loss suffered, meaning the dissipation of the confidential character of 
the information”) and [59] (the wrongful loss interest reflects “a plaintiff ’s right to 
preserve the confidentiality of [the] information”).
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47 Third, regardless of the nature of the information in question 
(that is, private/personal secrets or commercial confidences), it is observed 
that the judicial use of the word “conscience” – to more effectively protect 
the plaintiff against wrongful loss – has consistently surfaced in the 
course of the court’s determination of whether an equitable obligation 
of confidence ought to be imposed on the defendant, pursuant to the 
second requirement of the Coco formulation. This, it is submitted, follows 
logically from the authors’ understanding of the plaintiff ’s wrongful 
loss interest. So as to protect the information in question from losing 
its confidential character and thereby preserve the confidentiality of 
the information, the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest necessitates that 
whenever a defendant comes upon confidential information (either as 
a recipient or surreptitious taker), equity ought to impose upon him, 
in appropriate circumstances, an obligation of confidentiality and bind 
his conscience (to ensure that he observes the duty and respects the 
confidence).
48 Accordingly, in answering the question of when a defendant’s 
conscience is bound by the equitable duty of confidentiality, it is necessary 
for the court to examine, through the eyes of the “reasonable man”, “the 
notion of an obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances 
in or through which the information was communicated or obtained” 
[emphasis added].146 In this regard, it is trite law that equity will impose an 
obligation of confidence on the defendant whenever circumstances reveal 
that the recipient or surreptitious taker of information has the requisite 
knowledge or notice that the information in question is confidential.147 
To put it another way, equity will regard the defendant’s conscience as 
having been bound whenever he receives or obtains information which 
he knows (or ought to know) is confidential in nature and must be kept 
secret.148
49 By way of illustration, Belinda Ang Saw Ean J for the Court of 
Appeal in Adinop Co Ltd v Rovithai Ltd,149 when addressing the second 
Coco requirement, recognised that “an obligation of confidence in 
equity may arise [on an objective test] by applying principles of good 
146 Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 438, per Deane J.
147 See, eg, the oft-cited dicta of Lord Goff in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers 
Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281.
148 See Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449 at 456 (“It is the acceptance of the information 
on the basis that it will be kept secret that affects the conscience of the recipient of 
the information”) and Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 at [65] (“If information is 
accepted on the basis that it will be kept secret, the recipient’s conscience is bound by 
that confidence, and it will be unconscionable for him to break his duty of confidence 
by publishing the information to others”).
149 [2019] 2 SLR 808.
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faith and conscience”150 and that “[t]he intervention of equity ultimately 
depends on conscience”.151 On the facts, the Court of Appeal held that 
Rovithai Ltd’s conscience was bound because the circumstances of its 
receipt of confidential information “were part of the context affecting its 
conscience”.152
50 In light of the foregoing analysis, the authors are therefore of the 
view that the breach of confidence action is indeed capable of protecting 
a plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest through a judicious application (and 
satisfaction) of the second Coco requirement.
(3) Wrongful loss interest versus wrongful gain interest
51 Relevantly, it is in this context that the authors respectfully 
disagree with the Court of Appeal’s observation in I-Admin that “[t]he 
elements of breach of confidence set out in Coco explicitly protect the 
wrongful gain interest”.153 As the authors have sought to explain above,154 
the underlying objectives of the second and third Coco requirements 
are quite different. Whereas the former requirement serves the targeted 
purpose of protecting a plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest, the latter is 
prima facie concerned with protecting his wrongful gain interest.155
52 Furthermore, in response to the Court of Appeal’s thinking that 
“it may not always be the case that a defendant’s conduct will affect both 
the wrongful gain and wrongful loss interests”,156 the authors venture to 
suggest that:
(a) once it is established that the defendant’s conscience is 
bound by the equitable obligation of confidentiality pursuant 
to the second Coco requirement, the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss 
interest is at once engaged and protected, but not his wrongful 
gain interest unless the element of “misuse” (actual or threatened) 
on the part of the defendant is also satisfied pursuant to the third 
Coco requirement; and
150 Adinop Co Ltd v Rovithai Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 808 at [88]. See also [40]: “… equity may 
step in to impose a duty of confidence, where, for instance, ‘[the] contract does not 
necessarily assuage conscience, and equity may yet give force to conscience’ …”.
151 Adinop Co Ltd v Rovithai Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 808 at [89].
152 Adinop Co Ltd v Rovithai Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 808 at [89].
153 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [54].
154 See paras 37–50 above.
155 After all, a plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest is clearly referable to the gains/profits 
made by the defendant at his expense and can only be meaningfully spoken of 
where the defendant has made an unauthorised use or disclosure of the plaintiff ’s 
confidential information.
156 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [54].
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(b) in circumstances where the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain 
interest has been adversely affected by the defendant’s conduct 
(in light of the defendant’s misuse of the plaintiff ’s confidential 
information), it must follow that his wrongful loss interest 
would also have been correspondingly compromised: because 
the defendant’s breach of his duty of confidentiality – which 
results in his conscience being negatively impacted – would have 
eroded or destroyed the confidential character of the plaintiff ’s 
information.157
It therefore appears, from the latter observation in the preceding 
paragraph, that the element of “misuse” enshrined in the third Coco 
requirement conduces to protecting not only a plaintiff ’s wrongful gain 
interest but also, when properly understood, his wrongful loss interest 
as well. As such, the authors are also unable to agree with the Court of 
Appeal’s observation that “[t]he requirement of unauthorised use and 
detriment has held back the development of the law by overemphasising 
the wrongful gain interest at the expense of the wrongful loss interest”.158
(4) Is the wrongful gain interest still relevant under the “modified 
approach”?
53 Relying on lucid considerations of policy,159 the Court of Appeal 
chose to re-formulate the breach of confidence action – which, in the 
court’s view, hitherto did not adequately safeguard the plaintiff ’s wrongful 
loss interest160 – in the following manner:161
Once the plaintiff has established the first two Coco requirements, a prima facie 
presumption of breach of confidence arises and the legal burden shifts to the 
defendant to prove that his conscience has not been affected.
The Court of Appeal was of the view that “this modified approach 
places greater focus on the wrongful loss interest without undermining 
157 One possible exception to this proposition is perhaps where equity’s darling 
(the bona fide purchaser of information for value without notice) is involved – see 
Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 177, where 
Sir John Donaldson MR said: “Since the right to have confidentiality maintained is 
an equitable right, it will (in legal theory and practical effect if the aid of the court is 
invoked) ‘bind the conscience’ of third parties, unless they are bona fide purchasers 
for value without notice …”. To similar effect, see Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] 
EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [74].
158 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [58].
159 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55] and [62].
160 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [58].
161 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
© 2020 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 Revisiting the Law of Confidence in Singapore and a Proposal for a  
(2020) 32 SAcLJ New Tort of Misuse of Private Information 917
the protection of the wrongful [gain] interest”.162 Again, the authors 
respectfully disagree.
54 The Court of Appeal’s modified approach, in the authors’ view, 
primarily (perhaps wholly) gives effect to the wrongful loss interest of 
the plaintiff and leaves very little room, if any, for the engagement of his 
wrongful gain interest. If the foregoing analysis of the plaintiff ’s wrongful 
loss and wrongful gain interests is correct, this must be the logical 
consequence of the eradication of the third Coco requirement from the 
modified framework for the breach of confidence action. This will be 
explained below.
55 A plaintiff who initiates a breach of confidence action will 
naturally take advantage of the presumption and bear the legal burden, 
under the modified approach, to prove that the information in question 
“has the necessary quality of confidence about it” and that it has been 
“imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence”. This 
alone is sufficient to trigger the presumption in the plaintiff ’s favour and, 
in the process, engage the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest (because it 
has been established, pursuant to the second Coco requirement, that 
the defendant’s conscience has been bound by the equitable obligation 
of confidentiality). In raising the presumption, however, it matters not 
whether, on the facts, the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest has also been 
engaged (let alone compromised) because it is not at all incumbent on 
the plaintiff to show that the defendant has taken unfair advantage of 
such information and wrongfully gained (or profited) at his expense from 
the breach. Actual or threatened misuse of confidential information on 
the defendant’s part is beside the point since the presumption of breach of 
confidence is automatically triggered without proof by the plaintiff of the 
third Coco requirement. Indeed, the Court of Appeal was adamant that 
once the defendant’s conscience is found to have been bound in equity, 
possession by the defendant of the plaintiff ’s confidential information 
per se amounts to a prima facie breach of confidence.163 Under such 
circumstances, it is difficult to see how the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain 
interest can ever be engaged (or even considered) under the modified 
approach.164
162 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
163 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [63]–[66] 
(especially at [64] and [66]).
164 It may also be asked whether the modified approach could have tilted the balance of 
equities too far in favour of the plaintiff (in light of the irrelevance of the third Coco 
requirement and the corresponding superfluousness of the wrongful gain interest), 
particularly in situations that do not involve surreptitious takers of information.
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56 Be that as it may, it is respectfully submitted that the element 
of “misuse” enshrined in the third Coco requirement – and the 
associated wrongful gain interest of the plaintiff – should continue 
to have a  meaningful role to play in the analytical framework for the 
breach of confidence action. This is principally because it is information 
that is “confidential” in nature (and not per se “private/personal”) that 
the cause of action seeks to protect. It is therefore appropriate, at this 
juncture, to turn the present discussion to the importance of the privacy-
confidentiality distinction.
C. The privacy-confidentiality distinction
57 There are, of course, myriad ways in which the confidentiality of 
information might be undermined. In this regard, the Court of Appeal 
was of the view that “where defendants wrongfully access or acquire 
confidential information but do not use or disclose the same”, “their 
actions [nevertheless] compromise the confidentiality of the information 
in question” [emphasis added].165 Even assuming arguendo that a plaintiff 
would have suffered wrongful loss as a result of “the dissipation of the 
confidential character of the information”,166 the relevant question for the 
purposes of this article is whether a defendant’s “mere possession” of and 
act of “referring to” the plaintiff ’s confidential materials – in the absence 
of any misuse on his part – “is sufficient to complete the cause of action 
for breach of confidence”.167
58 In the authors’ respectful view, the short answer is “no”. It 
is submitted at the outset that whereas it is perfectly conceivable for 
a claimant’s privacy interests in information to have been compromised 
by the defendant’s mere possession of the information in question, this 
argument becomes less defensible (and is in fact rather undesirable as 
a matter of policy) where the former’s confidentiality interests in such 
information are concerned. It is also posited that a rational distinction 
should be drawn between the law’s protection of private/personal 
information on the one hand and commercially valuable information 
(or information of a commercially exploitable character) on the other.
165 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [43].
166 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [57].
167 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [44]. See also 
[63]–[66].
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(1) Privacy interests
59 The article first considers what it takes for someone’s action(s) 
to compromise the privacy of the information in question.168 The word 
“privacy” has existed in the judicial vocabulary since at least the middle of 
the 19th century. For instance, Knight Bruce VC in Prince Albert v Strange 
gave an illustration of how an individual’s privacy may be undermined in 
the following terms:169
[A]n intrusion – an unbecoming and unseemly intrusion … offensive to that 
inbred sense of propriety natural to every man – if, intrusion, indeed, fitly 
describes a sordid spying into the privacy of domestic life – into the home … 
[emphasis added].
60 A more contemporary interpretation – in deference to Art 8(1) 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms170 (“ECHR”) which recognises the need to respect one’s 
“private and family life” in the European context – focuses on whether 
the defendant’s conduct has “[interfered] with the personal autonomy of 
the individual”.171 In simpler terms, the question may be put thus: does 
the defendant’s conduct amount to a form of disrespect for an individual’s 
“informational privacy” (which broadly concerns any information about 
an individual’s private life172 and in which he has a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy”)?173
168 The genesis of the American tort of privacy can arguably be traced to two seminal 
articles, namely Samuel D Warren & Louis D Brandeis, “The Right of Privacy” (1890) 
4 Harv L Rev 193 and William L Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383. In 
the latter article, Prosser identified four distinct privacy torts, including the “public 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff ” (at 389). It is this specific 
tort that the present article – in its discourse on informational privacy – is chiefly 
concerned with. However, an in-depth analysis of the law of privacy in America is 
beyond the purview of this article.
169 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & SM 293 at 313.
170 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
213 UNTS 221 (4 November 1950; entry into force 3 September 1953) (hereinafter 
“European Convention on Human Rights”).
171 Per Simon LJ in ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611 at [46]. See also Sedley LJ 
in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 at [126], Lord Hoffmann in Campbell v MGN 
Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [50]–[51] and Eady J in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
[2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) at [7].
172 Per Lord Phillips MR in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] 
QB 125 at [83]:
What is the nature of ‘private information’? It seems to us that it must include 
information that is personal to the person who possesses it and that he does not 
intend shall be imparted to the general public. The nature of the information, 
or the form in which it is kept, may suffice to make it plain that the information 
satisfies these criteria.
173 See, eg, Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [21], [85] and [134]–[135].
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61 In the modern world, there is clearly a heightened need for 
individuals to be able to “control the dissemination of information 
about one’s private life” and retain “the right to the esteem and respect 
of other people”.174 An unwarranted intrusion into an individual’s private 
life – for instance, through unwanted attention – will, in all likelihood, 
cause alarm, offence, embarrassment, “dreadful unhappiness and 
distress”,175 even in the absence of any misuse of private information.176 
The authors are of the view that the unauthorised possession (including 
unauthorised access, acquisition, referencing and reviewing) of private/
personal information per se is sufficient to constitute an affront to human 
dignity and an individual’s self-esteem and hence an unlawful invasion 
of informational privacy. Such unconscionable conduct on the part of 
the defendant, to use a familiar catchphrase, sufficiently compromises 
the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest in the specific context of his privacy 
(but not his “confidentiality”) interests in the relevant information. This 
is particularly so where highly intimate, sensitive and/or embarrassing 
information is concerned177 and it seems that this is precisely when 
a “more stringent form” of duty ought to be imposed on the wrongdoer.178
62 Some examples of how an individual’s privacy interests may 
be infringed even where there is no clear breach of his confidentiality 
interests are briefly canvassed:
(a) A famous actor lies in hospital after suffering serious 
head injuries in a car accident (which is unreported in the 
media). Whilst recovering from brain surgery, two “fans” of his 
surreptitiously gain access to his hospital bed and take multiple 
photographs of him without consent for their personal keepsake. 
Assume that there is no further misuse of these photographs but 
the actor is obviously very upset.179
174 Per Lord Hoffmann in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [51].
175 See Sir Richard Henriques’s report titled “An Independent Review of the 
Metropolitan Police Service’s Handling of Non-recent Sexual Offence Investigations 
Alleged against Persons of Public Prominence” (31 October 2016) at para 1.67 – as 
cited in Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] AC 161 at [51]. In other words, harm 
in the form of emotional and psychological damage.
176 See A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195 at [11(x)].
177 For some examples in the case law, see n 142 above.
178 See Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 50.
179 Facts adapted from Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. See also Tom Bingham, “Should 
There Be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy?” (1996) European Human 
Rights L Rev 455 at 457:
It has also been suggested, to my mind more ingeniously than persuasively, that 
the action could have successfully been based on a breach of confidence. My 
own view is that a claim for breach of confidence could not have been successfully 
made, at any rate without doing impermissible violence to the principles upon 
which that cause of action is founded: the complaint in this case was not that 
(cont’d on the next page)
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(b) A photographer with a telephoto lens takes from 
a distance and without consent pictures of X (a married man) who 
is engaged in some “private act” with Y (who is not his spouse). 
Assume that there is no further misuse of these photographs but 
X subsequently finds out about them.180
(c) A supermodel tells the world in media interviews that she 
does not take drugs. Alas, she is subsequently caught standing on 
a public road just outside the premises of Narcotics Anonymous 
several times each week and is surreptitiously photographed 
by a photojournalist. Assume that there is no further misuse of 
these photographs but the supermodel is somehow aware of (and 
highly distressed by) the “transgression”.181
63 Although there is often a considerable degree of overlap 
between these two forms of interests, it is apparent from the foregoing 
illustrations182 that an individual’s privacy interests in information are 
not coterminous with his confidentiality interests therein. It is important 
to reiterate that a person’s informational privacy may well be undermined 
simply on the basis that the information concerned is already “out there” 
in the know of someone who has not been authorised by the plaintiff. 
Crucially, for the purposes of this article, the privacy-confidentiality 
distinction has also been expressly recognised in the case law – such as 
in England, New Zealand and here in this jurisdiction. The following 
extracts from the pool of relevant judgments are but some examples:
(a) “I cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the 
trial judge might find … that the photographer was an intruder 
with whom no relationship of trust or confidence had been 
established. In that event the court would have to explore the law 
information obtained or imparted in confidence was about to be misused, 
but that Mr Kaye’s privacy had been the subject of a monstrous invasion but for 
which the interview would never have been obtained at all. [emphasis added]
180 Facts adapted from Laws J’s illustration in Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire 
[1995] 1 WLR 804 at 807. Cf also Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; 
[2006] QB 125 at [105] as well as the facts in Mosley v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) regarding the intrusive nature of photography 
and clandestine filming/recording in the context of sexual activities (albeit 
unconventional) on private property. See further Arye Schreiber, “Confidence Crisis, 
Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should Be Independently Recognized in 
English Law” [2006] IPQ 161 at 182; Alistair Wilson & Victoria Jones, “Photographs, 
Privacy and Public Spaces” [2007] EIPR 357 at 359.
181 Facts adapted from Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457.
182 The authors recognise that all these illustrations involve photographs but (a) “[s]pecial 
considerations attach to photographs in the field of privacy”; and (b) “[a]s a means 
of invading privacy, a photograph is particularly intrusive” (Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
(No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 at [84], per Lord Phillips MR).
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relating to privacy when it is not bolstered by considerations of 
confidence.”183
(b) “The continuing use of the phrase ‘duty of confidence’ 
and the description of the information as ‘confidential’ is not 
altogether comfortable. Information about an individual’s 
private life would not, in ordinary usage, be called ‘confidential’. 
The more natural description today is that such information is 
private. The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as 
misuse of private information.”184
(c) “Privacy and confidence are different concepts. To press 
every case calling for a remedy for unwarranted exposure of 
information about the private lives of individuals into a cause of 
action having as its foundation trust and confidence will be to 
confuse those concepts.”185
(d) “As the law has developed, breach of confidence, or 
misuse of confidential information, now covers two distinct 
causes of action, protecting two different interests: privacy, and 
secret (‘confidential’) information. It is important to keep these 
two distinct.”186
(e) “We thus disagreed with the Judge’s rigid application of 
the test in Coco to the facts of this case in dealing with whether 
there was a serious question of a breach of confidence to be tried. 
In doing so, the Judge failed to consider English (and  other) 
jurisprudence which has, under the confidentiality genus, 
developed ‘different features’ for cases involving the protection 
183 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 at [59].
184 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [14], per Lord Nicholls. See also Campbell v 
MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [45]–[46], per Lord Hoffmann; Campbell  v MGN 
Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, [2003] QB 633 at [70], per  Lord  Phillips MR; and 
McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 at [8(iii)], per Buxton LJ.
185 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [48]. See also [246]: “It therefore seems to me, 
with respect to those who do not share this view, that it is more jurisprudentially 
straightforward and easier of logical analysis to recognise that confidence and 
privacy, while capable of overlapping, are essentially different concepts.”
186 OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [255], per Lord Nicholls, whose view of the matter 
was accepted as “obviously correct” by the English Court of Appeal in Google Inc v 
Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 at [25]. See also OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 
at [118], per Lord Hoffmann and Law Commission of England and Wales (Law Com 
No 110), Breach of Confidence: Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Cmnd 8388, 1981) at para 2.4 (“It is important to bear in 
mind the essentially different nature of the two kinds of right”). For a more recent 
consideration and endorsement of the privacy-confidentiality distinction in the UK, 
see PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26; [2016] AC 1081.
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of private information in contrast to the ‘old fashioned breach of 
confidence’ cases …” [emphasis in original]187
It is submitted that this snapshot of obiter dicta reveals strong judicial 
support, at least from a doctrinal perspective, for a clear demarcation 
in the respective causes of action for the protection of private/personal 
secrets on the one hand and commercial confidences on the other.188 
In other words, there are dangers in conflating the developing law 
of informational privacy and the traditional/“old fashioned” law of 
confidence, to which the discussion now turns.
(2) Confidentiality interests
64 The reasons why a third party’s unlawful possession of private/
personal information is sufficient to compromise the affected individual’s 
privacy interests have been set out above.189 By contrast, the authors 
do not think that a defendant’s mere “possession and referencing of 
the [plaintiff ’s] confidential materials constituted acts in breach of 
confidence”190 that could have amounted to “improper [threats]” to the 
“confidentiality” of the plaintiff ’s information.191 To understand why, 
it would be apt to consider how protected information may lose its 
confidential character (or how an individual’s confidentiality interests in 
information may be undermined).
65 First, the information in question – to be capable of protection 
– must be “confidential” in nature or must possess the “necessary 
quality of confidence about it”.192 Notably, the protection of confidential 
information is not at all dependent on the private/personal character of 
the information193 (trade secrets being archetypal) and, according to trite 
law, confidential information retains its confidentiality so long as the 
information is not in the “public domain” (or is generally inaccessible 
187 ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 at [19].
188 For strong academic support to similar effect, see Arye Schreiber, “Confidence Crisis, 
Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should Be Independently Recognized in 
English Law” [2006] IPQ 161 (especially at 168 ff).
189 See paras 59–63 above (especially para 61).
190 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [64].
191 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [51].
192 See Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 
at 215 and Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47.
193 As Simon LJ correctly said in ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611 at [90], 
“[n]ot all confidential information is private information, and not all confidential 
documents contain private information …”. Given this, the law of confidence 
will protect private/personal information only to the extent of “preserving the 
confidentiality” of such information: see Lord Hoffmann’s dicta in Campbell v MGN 
Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [44].
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to the public).194 In short, the law of confidence serves to protect and 
preserve the confidentiality of the information and, in the process, gives 
effect to the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest.
66 It should be borne in mind, however, that confidentiality 
interests in information are not so easily compromised despite the Court 
of Appeal’s expressed concern over the “fragility” of such information.195 
For instance, it has been argued that the “springboard” doctrine famously 
associated with Roxburgh J’s decision in Terrapin Ltd v Builders’ Supply Co 
(Hayes) Ltd196 is, in principle, not inconsistent with the “public domain” 
requirement:197
The purpose of the ‘springboard doctrine’ is to protect the plaintiff, not to 
punish the defendant; and we think that the interest of the plaintiff which the 
doctrine seeks to protect can be protected by a qualification of, or perhaps more 
accurately by a gloss on, the ‘public domain’ principle. [emphasis added]
67 The notion of “relative secrecy” (or “residual confidentiality”) 
which the law recognises further demonstrates that confidentiality is 
not an absolute concept. It has been said that “[i]nformation only ceases 
to be capable of protection as confidential when it is in fact known to 
a  substantial number of people” [emphasis added].198 It has also been 
said that “information will be confidential if it is available to one person 
(or a group of people) and not generally available to others, provided that 
the person (or group) who possesses the information does not intend 
that it should become available to others”.199 But it is, in the authors’ view, 
Cross J’s dicta in Franchi v Franchi that best illustrates the concept:200
194 According to Lord Greene MR in Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering 
Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 215, “it must not be something which is public property 
and public knowledge”.
195 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55].
196 Terrapin Ltd v Builders’ Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375 at 391. See also the 
fascinating analogy of a secret recipe for a “sparkling tomato cold soup” provided by 
George Wei JC (as he then was) in Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd 
[2014] 2 SLR 1045 at [137].
197 See the Law Commission of England and Wales (Law Com No 110), Breach of 
Confidence: Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 
1965 (Cmnd 8388, 1981) at para 6.70. See also Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 
1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2012] EWHC 616 (Ch); [2012] RPC 29 at [219].
198 Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449 at 454.
199 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 at [55].
200 Franchi v Franchi [1967] RPC 149 at 152–153. Citing this case, Sir John Donaldson MR 
in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 177 said:
As a general proposition, that which has no character of confidentiality because 
it has already been communicated to the world, i.e., made generally available to 
the relevant public, cannot thereafter be subjected to a right of confidentiality … 
However, this will not necessarily be the case if the information has previously 
(cont’d on the next page)
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Clearly a claim that the disclosure of some information would be a breach of 
confidence is not to be defeated simply by proving that there are other people in 
the world who know the facts in question besides the man as to whom it is said 
that his disclosure would be a breach of confidence and those to whom he has 
disclosed them. … It must be a question of degree depending on the particular 
case, but if relative secrecy remains, the plaintiff can still succeed. [emphasis 
added]
68 To prove the point that absolute secrecy is not necessary 
to establish the confidentiality of the information, the claimant 
(Prince Charles) in Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of Wales201 
was successful in restraining the publication of extracts from his private 
diaries despite the fact that he had circulated parts of them amongst all 
his private secretaries (indeed, the evidence also suggested that those to 
whom Prince Charles’ journals had been sent totalled 50 to 75, including 
politicians, media people, journalists and actors).202
69 Clearly, confidentiality in information is but a relative concept. 
The touchstone for determining when information can be said to have 
lost its confidential character (or when an individual’s confidentiality 
interests in information may have been undermined) is to ask whether “the 
information in question is so generally accessible [in the public domain] 
that, in all the circumstances, it cannot be regarded as confidential”.203 
Much depends on the general inaccessibility of the information in question 
(which is always a matter of degree), but, crucially for the purposes of this 
article, the fact that information is already known to a limited number of 
people does not rob the information of its confidentiality.
70 In light of this analysis, it is difficult to accept that a defendant’s 
mere “possession” and “referencing” of the plaintiff ’s confidential 
materials will, ipso facto, result in the information losing its confidential 
character and compromise the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest in the 
only been disclosed to a limited part of that public. It is a question of degree … 
[emphasis added].
 See also Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1 as well as the dicta of 
Lord Toulson (dissenting) in PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26; 
[2016] AC 1081 at [86]: “Confidentiality in a meaningful sense can survive a certain 
amount of leakage, and every case must be decided on its own facts …”.
201 [2006] EWCA Civ 1776; [2008] Ch 57.
202 See Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776; [2008] 
Ch 57 and HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 1685 
(Ch). See also A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195 and Mosley v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 687 (QB).
203 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] AC 109 at 282.
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process, a concern expressed by the Court of Appeal in I-Admin.204 
With respect, the authors are of the view that to “complete the cause of 
action for breach of confidence”205 after the defendant’s conscience has 
been bound by the equitable obligation of confidentiality (pursuant 
to the second Coco requirement), the plaintiff must further prove that 
the defendant has done (or at least threatened to do) something more 
to put the confidential information “out there”.206 The defendant, in the 
authors’ view, must be shown to have breached the plaintiff ’s confidence 
through the misuse of confidential information. This is the subject of the 
discussion in the next section.
(3) Confidentiality and breach: the relevance of “misuse”
71 As canvassed above,207 once the second Coco requirement 
is established, the defendant’s conscience is bound in equity by the 
obligation of confidentiality and the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest 
is thereby engaged. However, because the raison d’être for the law of 
confidence is to preserve the “confidentiality” (and not the “privacy”) 
of information, the action for breach of confidence can only be 
successfully brought against a defendant if his conduct – however 
unconscionable – has indeed compromised the plaintiff ’s confidentiality 
interests and caused the information in question to lose its confidential 
character. It is submitted that this is only possible where the defendant’s 
conscience is impacted (or negatively affected) by a further breach of the 
aforementioned obligation of confidentiality, and unless and until this 
breach on the defendant’s part has occurred, there can be no threat to 
(and undermining of) the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest. Indeed, in the 
absence of tangible evidence of breach, it may be argued that any such 
threat to the wrongful loss interest is purely illusory.
72 This position is fortified by the carefully articulated views 
expressed in the English Law Commission’s report on Breach of 
Confidence,208 with which the authors wholeheartedly agree. Notably, the 
English Law Commission explicitly recognised the “distinction between 
204 See, eg, I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [43] and 
[44].
205 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [44].
206 Cf Cross J’s dicta in Printers & Finishers v Holloway [1965] RPC 239 at 255.
207 See paras 47–50 above.
208 Law Commission of England and Wales (Law Com No 110), Breach of Confidence: 
Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 
(Cmnd 8388, 1981).
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[the protection of] privacy and confidence”.209 In emphasising the 
essentially different nature of the two kinds of right and causes of action 
(namely, for breach of confidence and the infringement of a privacy right 
in relation to the information itself), it was perceptively observed that:210
… a person who is under a duty of confidence in respect of information will not 
incur liability for breach of confidence unless he discloses or uses the information. 
By contrast, the very acquisition, by certain means or in certain circumstances, 
of information categorised as private would constitute an infringement of 
a right of privacy relating to the information if there were such a right. Under 
the recommendations in this report, on the other hand, concerned as it is 
solely with the law concerning confidence, no liability will arise merely from the 
acquisition of information by any of the reprehensible methods that we list, since 
a breach of confidence would be committed only by a subsequent disclosure or 
use of such information [emphasis added].
It is therefore respectfully submitted – contrary to the Court of Appeal’s 
modified approach211 – that to breach the duty of confidence and undermine 
the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest, the defendant must have misused 
(and not merely possess or make reference to) the plaintiff ’s confidential 
information.212 Once actual or threatened misuse has been established,213 
the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest can then be meaningfully engaged 
and, depending on the facts, may also be compromised as a result: if, 
for instance, the defendant has wrongfully gained/profited from the 
unauthorised use or disclosure of the information at the plaintiff ’s 
expense. For the avoidance of doubt, the authors reiterate the earlier 
argument that the defendant’s mere possession or acquisition of private/
209 Law Commission of England and Wales (Law Com No 110), Breach of Confidence: 
Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 
(Cmnd 8388, 1981) Part II(A) at pp 5–7.
210 See the Law Commission of England and Wales (Law Com No 110), Breach of 
Confidence: Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 
1965 (Cmnd 8388, 1981) at para 2.6. See also para 6.56.
211 As to which, see I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 
at [61].
212 As to what amounts to a breach by wrongful disclosure, Lord Hoffmann went so far 
as to say that it was not essential for the defendant, in breach of confidence, to “have 
intended widespread publication” since “[c]ommunication to a single unauthorised 
person would have been enough” [emphasis added]: see Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 
2 AC 457 at [45]. This principle seems to accord with the position under the law of 
patents, where, as to whether any piece of information has been “made available 
to the public” and therefore formed part of the state of the art, it is sufficient if 
the information in question has been made available to “at least one member of 
the public who was free in law and equity to use it”: see Fomento Industrial SA v 
Mentmore Manufacturing Co Ltd [1956] RPC 87 at 99–100; PLG Research Ltd v 
Ardon International Ltd [1993] FSR 197 at 226; First Currency Choice Pte Ltd v Main-
Line Corporate Holdings Ltd [2008] 1 SLR(R) 335 at [38]; Dien Ghin Electronic (S) Pte 
Ltd v Khek Tai Ting [2011] 3 SLR 227 at [29].
213 See the discussion in paras 105–110 below.
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personal information may, in appropriate circumstances, amount to 
an  infringement of a distinct right of “privacy” in relation to such 
information if there were such a right.
73 Finally, the authors posit that the “misuse” requirement in the 
context of breach of confidence is particularly appealing from a policy 
angle. Surreptitious takers of information aside (whose conduct is in any 
event presumed to be unconscionable),214 the position of mere recipients/
finders of information – whether it be a direct recipient (or confidant), 
an indirect recipient (or third party) or indeed an adventitious finder of 
information (who is much “beloved of law teachers”) – should also be 
considered.215
74 Who, it may be asked, would ever be willing to stand in the 
shoes of a confidant and lend the confider a listening ear if, by the very 
possession of confidential information with attendant knowledge, he 
were to be presumed – under the modified approach in I-Admin (CA)216 
that is applicable regardless of who the defendant is – to have acted in 
breach of confidence? Should the confidant (whose conscience has 
clearly been bound in equity) be made to bear the legal burden to prove 
that his conscience was not affected by the mere receipt of confidential 
information? No doubt, common sense dictates that no confider would, 
as a practical matter, ever contemplate suing the confidant (and relying 
on the presumption) under such circumstances.
75 But what about the indirect recipient of information? Is it 
desirable as a matter of policy for the third party to bear the burden of 
displacing the prima facie presumption and showing that his conscience 
had been unaffected in view of his receipt of confidential information 
with attendant knowledge from the confidant (who had clearly acted 
in breach)?217 Should the indirect recipient of information – who may 
be equally innocent for having lent his ear to the (hitherto innocent) 
confidant – be in any worse-off a position than confidants generally, in the 
absence of any misuse of confidential information on his part? A fortiori, 
214 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55], [62] 
and [71]. But cf Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1045 
at [181], Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] AC 109 at 270 and 
277 (where Lord Griffiths appeared to have taken the view that the law of confidence 
and the remedy of an injunction in particular have been “fashioned to protect the 
confider [and] not to punish the confidant”) and Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision 
Care Ltd [1997] RPC 289 at 401 and 403.
215 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] AC 109 at 281, per Lord Goff.
216 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
217 See also the discussion in Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 
2 SLR 1045 at [135].
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to what extent is this policy consideration pertinent where accidental 
finders are concerned – that is, those who come upon (and simply 
remain in possession of) confidential information in the most innocent 
of circumstances? Why should the accidental finder of confidential 
information with attendant knowledge also be made to explain the state 
of his conscience?
76 In short, between “innocent” recipients/finders of confidential 
information and alleged “wrongdoers” who use reprehensible means 
to purloin such information, where should the balance of equities lie 
sans misuse? Respectfully, the raising of the presumption of breach of 
confidence  – introduced in I-Admin (CA)’s modified approach – is 
not the answer because it does not differentiate between the various 
kinds of defendants contemplated in the preceding sentence. The 
answer, short of the law’s attempt at drawing distinctions on culpability 
between recipients/finders of confidential information on the one 
hand and surreptitious takers on the other, must lie in the utility of the 
“misuse” requirement. Because once it transpires that there is misuse 
(or “egregious” conduct)218 on the defendant’s part giving rise to a breach 
of the obligation of confidentiality, it is then clear – in the absence of 
good reason to the contrary – that the defendant’s conscience has been 
impacted (or negatively affected) to such an extent that equity ought to 
timeously intervene to aid the plaintiff.
(4) Did the defendants in I-Admin breach confidentiality?
77 On the facts of I-Admin, the trial judge (Abdullah J) found that 
the defendants had not misused the plaintiff ’s confidential information219 
and this finding was not disturbed on appeal.
78 In distinguishing the facts in Clearlab on the point of misuse, 
Abdullah J held that “copying of information alone does not constitute 
breach of confidence”220 and the evidence on the whole fell short 
of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the defendants in 
I-Admin had used or embodied the plaintiff ’s confidential information 
in a competing business and/or to create competing products.221 Given 
the evidence, inter alia, that payitems were “common knowledge” in 
218 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [125].
219 See I-Admin  (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [107] 
and [117] ff (especially at [123]).
220 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [119]. See also 
[117]: “I took the view, however, that mere copying did not amount to actual use for 
the purposes of making out the breach of confidence claim.”
221 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [27] and [123].
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the payitem industry,222 the judge found that the defendants’ competing 
products were indeed independently derived from information in the 
public domain223 and were “ultimately dissimilar”.224 Crucially, this lack 
of a causal link – which would otherwise have given rise to evidence of 
misuse (albeit always a question of fact in each case)225 – between the 
plaintiff ’s confidential information and the defendants’ resulting conduct 
in producing the derivative products in question proved fatal to the 
plaintiff ’s breach of confidence claim under the Coco framework. This 
is notwithstanding Abdullah J’s findings that the defendants had indeed 
referenced and reviewed the plaintiff ’s confidential materials prior to 
developing their own derivative products.226
79 The authors venture to suggest, however, that this is not at all 
a surprising outcome. Numerous other cases in Singapore and England 
have also been decided in similar fashion, with plaintiffs failing to 
surmount the “misuse” hurdle in their breach of confidence claims.227 
222 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [119].
223 Cf Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 
at 215; Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923 at 931; Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS 
Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1045 at [136] ff (especially at [170] ff).
224 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [121]. Cf also 
the court’s findings in Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 634 (Ch) 
at [121] and [123] (upheld on appeal: [2016] EWCA Civ 1214). Interestingly, it 
was observed that the first defendant in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying 
Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [7] “found the [plaintiff ’s] software, in particular its 
payroll calculation engine, flawed and inadequate for the tasks it had to perform” 
and sometime later, “the first [defendant] expressed his frustrations to the second 
[defendant], who shared his desire to design a better payroll software”.
225 For guidelines as to the sort of evidence that could give rise to a reasonable inference 
of misuse, see Laddie J’s decision (albeit at the interlocutory injunction stage) in 
CMI-Centers for Medical Innovation GmbH v Phytopharm plc [1999] FSR 235 at [61].
226 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [123]. Cf also 
Laddie J’s decision in Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd [1997] RPC 289 
at 401 and 404. On the importance of establishing a causal link, Laddie J said this 
(at 404): “It is not every derived product, process or business which should be 
treated as a camouflaged embodiment of the confidential information”. A derived/
derivative product is one made from or with the assistance of information which 
is still confidential but where it does not itself directly disclose or incorporate the 
information (see 396 and 401). Relevantly, where the confidential information has 
(by way of referencing it) contributed towards the making of a derivative product, 
the contribution must be sufficiently “significant” and have made a difference to the 
latter in terms of “content, time to produce or use” (at 404).
227 See, eg, Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 51; Force India Formula 
One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2012] EWHC 616 (Ch) at [267] 
and [338] ff (especially at [339]–[340]) (upheld on appeal: [2013] EWCA Civ 780 
at [94]); Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1045 at [170] ff 
(especially at [199]); Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 634 (Ch) 
at [123] (upheld on appeal: [2016] EWCA Civ 1214); iVenture Card Ltd v Big Bus 
Singapore City Sightseeing Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 109 at [27].
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For instance, Birss J in Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd228 found that 
even though there were similarities in ideas and features between the 
defendant’s TV programme and the plaintiff ’s original format for a music 
talent show, the inference of copying (from tell-tale indications) was 
insufficient to constitute probative evidence of the requisite causal link 
and hence of any misuse by the defendant of the plaintiff ’s confidential 
information.229 Instead, it was decided that the defendant’s competing 
product was created or derived “entirely independently” of the plaintiff ’s 
ideas (that is, without either deliberate or sub-conscious copying) and the 
breach of confidence claim must therefore fail. What is also noteworthy 
for the purposes of this article is the court’s conclusion that there was no 
misuse and breach of confidence on the defendant’s part notwithstanding 
the judge’s observation that the defendant’s employees were likely to 
have not only possessed, but also reviewed and made reference to, the 
plaintiff ’s confidential ideas.230 Birss J’s decision was upheld on appeal.231
80 Similarly, Choo J on home ground found that the defendants 
in iVenture had not misused the plaintiffs’ confidential information, 
principally because the defendants’ competing product (the HiPPO 
Singapore Pass) was part of an integrated IT system which had been 
independently developed. As such, irrespective of whether the first two 
limbs of the Coco test had been made out, the plaintiffs’ claim for breach 
of confidence could not succeed.232
81 Given the tenor of the discussion above, the authors are in 
complete agreement with Abdullah J’s conclusion that the plaintiff ’s 
breach of confidence claims against the defendants ought to have been 
dismissed on the basis of the plaintiff ’s failure to establish the “misuse” 
requirement and hence any breach of confidentiality on the part of the 
defendants, even under the “expansive approach” alluded to in Clearlab 
(which will be examined below).233 The authors do, of course, recognise 
that the thesis in this article is at odds with the outcome of the appeal in 
228 [2014] EWHC 634 (Ch).
229 Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 634 (Ch) at [123].
230 See Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 634 (Ch) at [106]: “… 
although Mr Gray and Mr Murphy genuinely believe they never read the deck, 
perhaps they are mistaken. Perhaps one of them did skim it, the key ideas lodged in 
their mind and went on to influence the development of Must Be The Music.”
231 See Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1214 and cf also Invenpro 
(M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1045 at [184]  ff (especially 
at [195]).
232 See iVenture Card Ltd v Big Bus Singapore City Sightseeing Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 109 
at [27].
233 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [124]–[125], 
citing Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [205]–[207]. See 
further paras 106–108 below.
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I-Admin and to that extent, the authors would respectfully disagree with 
the Court of Appeal’s modified approach for the breach of confidence 
action in Singapore.234
(5) A word on Imerman
82 It appears that the Court of Appeal in I-Admin was rather 
influenced by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Imerman,235 
a case that also involved the surreptitious taking of information.236 So 
much is clear from the Court of Appeal’s reliance on Imerman in framing 
its modified approach for the breach of confidence action to redress the 
perceived imbalance arising from the law’s failure to give adequate effect 
to a plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest.237
83 Therefore, in line with the English court’s reasoning that the 
mere “looking at [or examining of] documents” – which one knows to 
be confidential or knows the claimant can reasonably expect to be kept 
private – is itself a breach of confidence (or “capable of constituting 
an actionable wrong”),238 the Court of Appeal in I-Admin came to the 
same conclusion that the defendant’s “possession and referencing” of 
the plaintiff ’s confidential materials also constituted acts in breach of 
confidence.239 However, as explained above,240 while it is arguable that 
a plaintiff ’s privacy interests in information may well be compromised by 
the defendant’s mere possession of (and “looking at”) the information in 
question, it is rather more doubtful if the same argument can extend to an 
individual’s confidentiality interests in the same. In other words, it might 
seem like a stretch of the imagination to suggest that the “confidential” 
(as opposed to the “private”) character of the information contained in 
a secret document would have been compromised simply upon a visual 
examination of the document without consent.241
234 As to which, see I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 
at [61].
235 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592.
236 Lord Neuberger MR described Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 
2 WLR 592 as “an extreme case of wrongful access to confidential material” and that 
“[w]hat happened in this case was an invasion of privacy in an underhand way and 
on an indiscriminate scale”: see [144].
237 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [59].
238 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [68] and [69].
239 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [64], and see 
generally [44] and [63]–[66].
240 See paras 59–63 above.
241 With respect, the authors are unable to agree with Lord Neuberger MR when he 
said that “a claimant who establishes a right of confidence in certain information 
contained in a document should be able to restrain any threat by an unauthorised 
defendant to look at … the contents of the document” because “the information 
(cont’d on the next page)
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84 In any event, it is submitted that the Imerman decision and 
the English court’s use of the “confidence”/“confidential” nomenclature 
must be understood in context, as Imerman was a case that dealt with 
the defendant’s surreptitious taking of private/personal information242 
(that is, information in which the claimant had a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy”).243 This is clearly evidenced by the following dicta where 
Lord Neuberger MR (as he then was) rather unhelpfully conflated the 
two distinct interests, namely “confidentiality” on the one hand and 
informational “privacy” on the other:244
It would seem to us to follow that intentionally obtaining such information, 
secretly and knowing that the claimant reasonably expects it to be private, is 
itself a breach of confidence. [emphasis added]
With respect, the unfortunate obfuscation of these concepts is repeated 
by his Lordship throughout his judgment.245
85 Indeed, it has been rightly pointed out by the learned authors of 
Gurry on Breach of Confidence that “[w]hat is confusing about Imerman … 
is that the court veered between the terminology of the ‘old’ and the 
‘new’” and the court “couched most of its reasoning in ‘old-fashioned’ 
confidence terminology with the discussion of Articles 8 and 10 being 
largely implicit”.246 In this regard, it would have been preferable for 
Lord  Neuberger MR to have abandoned the language of “confidence” 
altogether on the facts of the case before him, as did Lord Nicholls in 
will, through the unauthorised act of the defendant, either lose its confidential 
character, or will at least be at risk of doing so”: see Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] 
EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [69].
242 Involving electronic copies of the claimant’s e-mails and other documents (detailing 
his personal finances and business dealings) stored on his computer server that were 
likely to be used in separate divorce proceedings concerning an ex-wife’s application 
for ancillary financial relief.
243 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [21], per Lord Nicholls, [85], per Lord Hope, 
and [134], per Baroness Hale. This point was explicitly recognised by Lee Seiu Kin J 
in Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [203].
244 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [68] (and cf also, 
to similar effect, Lord Woolf CJ’s dicta in A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] 
QB 195 at [11(ix)]). With respect, this unhelpful conflation of doctrinally distinct 
concepts (accompanied by Lord Neuberger MR’s loose and unfortunate use of 
the word “confidential” for what, in the authors’ view, should have been the word 
“private”) was repeated at [72]. And cf [77].
245 See, eg, Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [79] and 
[89].
246 See Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence – The Protection of Confidential 
Information (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2012) at para 7.155. The authors also 
noted therein that the language of “confidence” rather than “privacy” dominated 
Lord Neuberger MR’s judgment.
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Campbell v MGN Ltd247 (“Campbell”) where his Lordship candidly 
acknowledged that:248
… [t]he continuing use of the phrase ‘duty of confidence’ and the description 
of the information as ‘confidential’ is not altogether comfortable. Information 
about an individual’s private life would not, in ordinary usage, be called 
‘confidential’. The more natural description today is that such information is 
private. The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private 
information.
86 Nevertheless, when examined in this light, it is perhaps 
understandable why Lord Neuberger MR in the English Court of Appeal 
adopted the view that mere possession and referencing of an individual’s 
private/personal information – even without any evidence of misuse on 
the defendant’s part – may be sufficient to complete the cause of action 
for breach of confidence and grant the claimant equitable relief (in the 
absence of good reason otherwise) in the English context.249 This line of 
thinking is, in any event, consistent with the views expressed above.250 
However, it would not have been appropriate, in the authors’ respectful 
view, for the Court of Appeal to have also taken the same approach on the 
specific facts of I-Admin, which did not concern (confidential) private/
personal information. After all, as Lord Phillips CJ stated:251
… [i]nformation received in confidence may not be of such a nature as to 
engage Article 8. A trade secret [or commercial confidences in general] will 
not necessarily do so.
87 Be that as it may, there are two other aspects of Lord Neuberger 
MR’s judgment that the authors would like to critique. First, as regards 
the relationship between the law of confidence and the contemporary 
protection afforded to informational privacy under English law, his 
Lordship was of the opinion thus:252
However, given that the domestic law on confidentiality had already started to 
encompass privacy well before the 1998 Act came into force, and that, with the 
1998 Act now in force, privacy is still classified as part of the confidentiality 
genus, the law should be developed and applied consistently and coherently in 
247 [2004] 2 AC 457.
248 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [14].
249 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 (“Imerman”) was 
clearly a case where an English court had to give effect to the claimant’s right to 
privacy under Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: see Imerman 
at [76]–[77] and [154].
250 See paras 59–63 above.
251 Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 at [29]. 
The reference to Art 8 is that of the European Convention on Human Rights.
252 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [67].
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both privacy and ‘old fashioned confidence’ cases, even if they sometimes may 
have different features. [emphasis in original; other emphasis added]
88 If, by these remarks, Lord Neuberger MR meant to conflate 
the developing law of informational privacy and the traditional law of 
confidence (inherently “different features” notwithstanding), the authors 
respectfully disagree and caution against adopting such an approach 
given the views expressed above on the significance of the privacy-
confidentiality distinction.253 Further, it appears somewhat ironic that 
his Lordship would have followed this line of reasoning (no doubt in 
the name of “consistency” and “coherence”)254 when, having referred to 
the unease in “shoe-horning” a claim based upon the tort of misuse of 
private information into the “old fashioned” cause of action for breach 
of confidence,255 it was expressly pointed out in his judgment that there 
were “dangers” in taking this precise path.256
89 Relevantly, it also appears that Lord Neuberger MR’s dicta  – 
in finding it acceptable to further develop the law’s protection of 
informational privacy under the umbrella of the “old fashioned” breach of 
confidence action – is out of step with judicial guidance emanating from 
the jurisprudence of the apex court in the UK. It is apposite to reiterate 
Lord Hoffmann’s advice in OBG Ltd v Allan257 that it is “necessary” to 
distinguish between privacy claims under Art 8 of the ECHR and 
“old fashioned” breach of confidence claims for breach of commercial 
confidences:258
It is first necessary to avoid being distracted by the concepts of privacy and personal 
information. In recent years, English law has adapted the action for breach of 
confidence to provide a remedy for the unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information: see Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. This development has 
been mediated by the analogy of the right to privacy conferred by article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and has required a balancing of 
that right against the right to freedom of expression conferred by article 10. But 
this appeal is not concerned with the protection of privacy. Whatever may have 
been the position of the Douglases, who, as I mentioned, recovered damages for 
an invasion of their privacy, OK!’s claim is to protect commercially confidential 
information and nothing more. So your Lordships need not be concerned with 
253 See paras 59–70 above.
254 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [67].
255 See Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 at [96], 
per Lord Phillips MR. See also [53]: “We cannot pretend that we find it satisfactory to 
be required to shoe-horn within the cause of action of breach of confidence claims for 
publication of unauthorised photographs of a private occasion” [emphasis added].
256 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [66].
257 [2008] 1 AC 1. Cf also his Lordship’s dicta in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 
at [51]–[52].
258 OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [118].
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Convention rights. OK! has no claim to privacy under article 8 nor can it make a 
claim which is parasitic upon the Douglases’ right to privacy. [emphasis added]
Lord Nicholls in the same case also made a similar (and equally 
compelling) point:259
As the law has developed, breach of confidence, or misuse of confidential 
information, now covers two distinct causes of action, protecting two different 
interests: privacy, and secret (‘confidential’) information. It is important to keep 
these two distinct. In some instances information may qualify for protection 
both on grounds of privacy and confidentiality. In other instances information 
may be in the public domain, and not qualify for protection as confidential, and 
yet qualify for protection on the grounds of privacy. Privacy can be invaded 
by further publication of information or photographs already disclosed 
to the public. Conversely, and obviously, a trade secret may be protected as 
confidential information even though no question of personal privacy is 
involved. [emphasis added]
90 A more recent reminder of the bifurcated approach which the 
law of confidence in England has now adopted – to address a claimant’s 
distinct interests in protecting informational privacy on the one hand and 
the confidentiality of his information on the other – can be gleaned from 
the following dicta by Briggs LJ (as he then was), with which the authors 
wholeheartedly agree:260
By contrast with the law relating to private confidences, which has been 
transformed by the influence of the Human Rights Convention, the law relating 
to mis-use of confidential information in a business context has been well settled 
for very many years. The following well-known dictum of Megarry J in Coco v 
A N Clark (Engineers) Limited [1969] RPC 41, at 47 has stood the test of time: 
… [emphasis added]
91 Separately, in noting that the more contemporary incarnation of 
the law of confidence in England clearly recognises the action for “misuse 
of private information”261 as an actionable wrong, Lord Neuberger MR in 
Imerman said that this “does not mean that there has to be such misuse 
before a claim for breach of confidentiality can succeed”.262 With respect, 
259 OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [255], whose view of the matter was accepted 
as “obviously correct” by the English Court of Appeal in Google Inc v Vidal-Hall 
[2015] EWCA Civ 311 at [25]. Cf also his Lordship’s dicta in Campbell v MGN Ltd 
[2004] 2 AC 457 at [14]. It appears that private/personal information may be more 
resilient and resistant to public exposure than in the case of confidential commercial 
information. See also, in this regard, PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] 
UKSC 26; [2016] AC 1081.
260 Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1214 at [2].
261 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [14], per Lord Nicholls: “The essence of the 
tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information.”
262 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [71].
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the authors are somewhat sceptical of this “blanket” (and controversial) 
proposition if it is taken to mean that proof of misuse (whether actual or 
threatened) is not required under English law.263 After all, his Lordship 
had expressed the view that a defendant’s unauthorised possession of and 
“looking at” the claimant’s protected information – even if the defendant 
“did not intend to reveal the contents to any third party” – was sufficient 
to infringe the claimant’s rights in confidence/privacy (because “there 
would be a risk of the information getting out”) [emphasis added].264 
It is observed, parenthetically, that this “blanket” proposition appears to 
have influenced the Court of Appeal’s deliberations for modifying the 
approach that should be taken in relation to breach of confidence claims 
in Singapore.265
92 The decision of the House of Lords in Campbell has traditionally 
been recognised to have extended the “old fashioned” breach of confidence 
action to embrace and give full effect to Art 8 of the ECHR in English law. 
However, it must be emphasised that the Campbell decision is not clear 
authority for the proposition that misuse on the part of the defendant is 
not a necessary ingredient in establishing the tort of misuse of private 
information. This is because there was ample evidence of actual misuse in 
that case – which, it is noted, is typical of cases involving the surreptitious 
taking of information – due to the unauthorised publication by the Daily 
Mirror of various pieces of information in which the claimant (Naomi 
Campbell) had a reasonable expectation of privacy.266
93 On facts that were largely similar to Imerman, the case of White v 
Withers LLP267 concerned, inter alia, the state of English law on misuse of 
private information (or the invasion of informational privacy). Crucially, 
for the purposes of this article, there was no evidence that the defendant 
263 Presumably under both the “old” and “new” law, given the authors’ interpretation 
of Lord Neuberger MR’s enigmatic observation as follows: “The fact that misuse of 
private information has … ‘become recognised over the last few years as a wrong 
actionable in English law’ does not mean that there has to be such misuse before 
a  claim for breach of confidentiality [informational privacy?] can succeed, unless 
that was the position before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, which it 
was not”: Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [71]. 
See also ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 at [19]: “Further, with respect to the third 
[Coco] element, it was held in Imerman (at [71]) that there was no need to prove that 
there had been a misuse of the information for the claim to succeed (although this 
holding purported to apply to ‘old fashioned breach of confidence’ cases as well).” 
[emphasis added]
264 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [72].
265 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [59], where 
the Court of Appeal observed that the court in Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA 
Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 had “relaxed the prerequisite of use and detriment”.
266 See Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [15].
267 [2008] EWHC 2821 (QB).
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firm of solicitors had disclosed any private information to third parties or 
that there was any threat or intention to do so in the future.268 The claimant 
therefore did not seek an injunction to prevent onward disclosure of such 
information. Nevertheless, counsel for the defendant made the following 
submissions:269
… that the mere receipt of documents by the solicitors from their client, and their 
continued retention in connection with the matrimonial proceedings, simply 
cannot give rise to a cause of action. Nor could the fact that such documents 
had been read and noted in connection with the litigation. [emphasis added]
Agreeing, Eady J in the English High Court held that there was no relevant 
“misuse” – which, in the authors’ view, can be interpreted to mean both 
actual as well as threatened misuse – of any information on the part of the 
defendant solicitors to give rise to a cause of action for misuse of private 
information.270 Eady J’s decision to strike out the claimant’s action was 
upheld on appeal, where Ward LJ recorded his obiter concurrence with 
the trial judge’s reasoning as follows:271
Mrs White’s communication of [the claimant’s] confidential/private information 
to her solicitors [the defendant] for their use in the litigation could never be 
characterised as misuse of it. [emphasis added]
The English Court of Appeal accordingly ruled that “Eady J was quite 
right to dismiss the claim relating to the misuse of confidential or private 
information”.272 This must necessarily suggest, contrary to Lord Neuberger 
MR’s “blanket” proposition noted above,273 that the “misuse” requirement 
is very much alive and well in the corpus of English law on breach of 
confidence and misuse of private information, however the cause of 
action is labelled and pleaded.
94 The reasoning of Eady J and Ward LJ appear to be at odds with 
that of Lord Neuberger MR in Imerman, who sought to confine Eady J’s 
holding – in relation to the absence of any misuse (actual/threatened) by the 
defendant – to the specific facts of that case (that is, “as applying only to the 
receipt of documents by solicitors from their client”).274 For the purposes 
of this article, what is notable about these contrasting decisions on largely 
268 Indeed, such information as the defendant firm of solicitors had been given was 
received, read/noted and retained by them purely for use in connection with 
matrimonial court proceedings and the protection of their client’s interest in that 
context.
269 White v Withers LLP [2008] EWHC 2821 (QB) at [8].
270 See White v Withers LLP [2008] EWHC 2821 (QB) at [16].
271 White v Withers LLP [2009] EWCA Civ 1122 at [23].
272 White v Withers LLP [2009] EWCA Civ 1122 at [68].
273 See para 91 above.
274 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [70].
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similar facts is this – whereas Lord Neuberger MR was of the view that just 
because “the defendant did not intend to reveal the contents to any third 
party [did not mean that this] would not meet the claimant’s concern [of 
a breach of confidentiality/privacy]”,275 the fact that the defendant had 
not disclosed any private information to third parties and that there was 
no threat or intention to do so in the future proved entirely fatal to the 
claimant’s action for misuse of private information in the White v Withers 
LLP litigation.276 The authors further observe, in respectful disagreement 
with Lord Neuberger MR, that there is no indication whatsoever in both 
sets of judgments in White v Withers LLP that the “misuse” requirement 
in the English law of confidence (as  extended to protect against the 
misuse of private information) ought to be confined only to situations 
that involve “the receipt of [confidential/private] documents by solicitors 
from their client”.277 It is also in this context that the authors disagree with 
Lord Neuberger MR’s “blanket” proposition that proof of misuse is not 
required under the “old” (or traditional) as well as “new” (or extended) 
action for breach of confidence in England.278
95 Finally, a brief survey of English case law on claims for breach of 
informational privacy under Art 8 of the ECHR reveals that a defendant’s 
mere access to, or acquisition, possession or referencing of, the claimant’s 
private/personal information may not suffice to constitute “misuse” of the 
information in question. For instance, Lord Woolf CJ said that “[w]hether 
a duty of confidence does exist which courts can protect … will depend 
on all the circumstances of the relationship between the parties at the 
time of the threatened or actual breach of the alleged duty of confidence” 
[emphasis added].279 Similarly, Lord Phillips CJ was of the view that:280
… [w]hether a publication, or threatened publication, involves a breach of 
a relationship of confidence, an interference with privacy or both, it is necessary 
to consider whether these matters justify the interference with Article 10 rights 
that will be involved if the publication is made the subject of a judicial sanction. 
[emphasis added]
Such dicta may therefore suggest that some form of “misuse” on the 
part of the defendant – either actual or at least threatened misuse, and 
certainly going beyond a mere “risk of the information getting out” 
[emphasis added]281 – might still be necessary to complete the cause of 
275 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [72].
276 White v Withers LLP [2008] EWHC 2821 (QB); White v Withers LLP [2009] EWCA 
Civ 1122.
277 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [70].
278 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [71].
279 A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195 at [11(ix)].
280 Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 at [65].
281 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [72].
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action for breach of confidence/misuse of private information in the 
English context. For all these reasons, it remains doubtful (contrary to 
what Lord Neuberger MR had articulated in Imerman)282 that the notion 
of misuse has been categorically rendered redundant by contemporary 
developments in the breach of confidence landscape in England.
(6) Coda on the requirement of “misuse”
96 Arising from the privacy-confidentiality distinction which has 
been carefully studied above,283 the authors remain of the view that the 
element of “misuse” enshrined in the third Coco requirement – and the 
accompanying wrongful gain interest of the plaintiff – should continue to 
have a meaningful role to play in the analytical framework for the breach 
of confidence action. It has been explained that this is principally because 
it is information that is “confidential” in nature (and not per se “private/
personal”) that the “old fashioned” cause of action seeks to protect.
97 There is also another justification for the misuse requirement that 
is particularly pertinent to breach of confidence disputes in the commercial 
context. Where commercially valuable information or information 
of a commercially exploitable character is the subject of the dispute in 
question, the misuse requirement serves as a meaningful policy lever: to 
distinguish between instances of fair competition (where the defendant 
has accessed and retained the plaintiff ’s confidential information – for 
instance, in his head/memory because of his former employment – or has 
received confidential information as a consequence of a prior working 
relationship with the plaintiff but does not, and has no intention to, 
misuse such information (referencing and reviewing notwithstanding) 
in a competing business and/or to produce competing products) and 
instances of unfair competition (where the defendant has clearly taken 
“unfair advantage” of the plaintiff ’s confidential information by using it – 
in a competing business and/or for purposes thereof – as a “springboard” 
to gain an unfair head-start over other trade competitors).284 As a matter 
of policy, liability for breach of confidence should only arise in the latter 
scenario where there is at least some tangible evidence of harm or damage 
suffered by the plaintiff (or, in the alternative, of the defendant having 
282 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [71].
283 See paras 57–76 above.
284 See generally Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER 492; Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v 
Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203; Terrapin Ltd v Builders’ Supply Co 
(Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375; Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923; Tang Siew 
Choy v Certact Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR(R) 835; Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 
1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2012] EWHC 616 (Ch); [2012] RPC 29 (especially 
at [267]–[268]); Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163; and Adinop 
Co Ltd v Rovithai Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 808.
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wrongfully gained/benefited in some way at the plaintiff ’s expense). The 
authors would argue that where unfair competition is made out, there is 
likely to be some measure of harm to the economic value of the plaintiff ’s 
commercial confidence – for instance, because the defendant has made 
an unauthorised use of the plaintiff ’s confidential information “without 
paying a reasonable sum for it”.285
98 It is also in the context of the defendant’s misuse of confidential 
information (and, on certain facts, resulting unfair competition) that the 
protection of the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest through the action for 
breach of confidence would be triggered. For it is only when misuse on 
the part of the defendant is established that the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain 
interest can be meaningfully engaged and compromised – such as when 
the defendant has wrongfully gained/profited from the unauthorised use 
or disclosure of the confidential information at the plaintiff ’s expense. 
To the extent that the Court of Appeal’s modified approach (and its 
triggering of the presumption of breach of confidence after the plaintiff ’s 
wrongful loss interest has been engaged) does not leave any room for 
a court’s consideration of the misuse requirement and hence the plaintiff ’s 
wrongful gain interest, the authors respectfully disagree with its adoption 
for breach of confidence claims in Singapore.
D. Breach of confidence actions in Singapore: A suggested way 
forward
99 For “old fashioned” breach of confidence actions in Singapore, 
the authors respectfully suggest retaining the three-element analytical 
framework famously set out in Coco – but in a modified fashion.286 In 
the authors’ view, the long-standing Coco test for breach of confidence is 
attractive from the doctrinal and policy perspectives because it embraces 
a balanced approach in protecting, at the appropriate stages of the test, 
both the wrongful loss and wrongful gain interests of the plaintiff.287
100 It may be thought that the recent I-Admin (CA) decision stands 
in the way of this proposal but the authors argue otherwise. Curiously, 
up until three days before judgment in I-Admin (CA) was handed down 
by Sundaresh Menon CJ, the test in Coco was still good law in Singapore 
285 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 50.
286 Explained at paras 111–118 below.
287 Whereas the second Coco requirement serves the purpose of protecting a plaintiff ’s 
wrongful loss interest, the misuse requirement is principally concerned with 
protecting his wrongful gain interest. The authors therefore take the view that 
because the Coco framework pays due regard to the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss interest 
without undermining the protection of his wrongful gain interest, it best accords 
with equity and fairness to both plaintiff and defendant.
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and usefully adopted/endorsed (albeit with modification) by a similarly 
constituted Court of Appeal in LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe 
Keet288 (“LVM (CA)”) with Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA delivering 
the court’s judgment.289 It is observed at the outset that (a) the court in 
LVM (CA), in embracing a modified Coco test, did not refer to the then-
impending I-Admin (CA) decision; and (b) I-Admin (CA) did not at all 
cite the earlier decision and, more importantly, expressly overrule the 
application of the Coco framework – against the acknowledged backdrop 
of its very recent endorsement by the same court just three days earlier – 
to future breach of confidence actions in Singapore. Further, there is no 
indication in either case that their guidance on and application of the law 
of confidence ought only to be confined to the specific facts of each case – 
with the earlier decision on lawyer–client confidentiality and I-Admin 
(CA) concerning a breach of confidence dispute “arising out of erstwhile 
employer-employee relationships”.290 For these reasons, the authors are of 
the respectful view that a future Court of Appeal, in an appropriate case 
coming before it, has every opportunity to revisit its decision in I-Admin 
(CA) and seriously consider (and hopefully endorse) this proposal, which 
will now be discussed.
(1) Why modify the third Coco requirement?
101 In the authors’ view, in line with conventional wisdom and also 
the views expressed in LVM (CA),291 the legal burden of proof must 
remain on the plaintiff throughout to establish all three elements of the 
Coco test on a balance of probabilities. Indeed, “mere assertions or vague 
generalisations” of confidentiality would be insufficient to discharge this 
burden of proof.292 However, the authors do recognise the necessity for 
a clarification and modification of the third limb of the test – namely, 
“there must be an unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of 
the person communicating it”293 – so as to (a) correct the misperception 
that proof of actual misuse of confidential information on the part of 
the defendant is required; and (b) jettison the additional requirement of 
“detriment” to the plaintiff, respectively.
288 [2020] 1  SLR 1083. Cf also the reasoning in and outcome of this case with 
White  v Withers LLP [2008] EWHC 2821 (QB) and White v Withers LLP [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1122.
289 The only difference in the constitution of the Court of Appeal is that Quentin Loh J 
sat in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 whereas it 
was Judith Prakash JA who presided alongside the other two members of the apex 
court in the other appeal.
290 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [3].
291 See LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [23] ff.
292 See LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [18] and [23].
293 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 48.
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102 With regard to “detriment”, in laying down the third requirement 
for the breach of confidence action, it is true that Megarry  J spoke of 
an unauthorised use of confidential information to the “detriment” of the 
confider (plaintiff). Nevertheless, it is clear that the judge was equivocal as 
to the need for such a requirement – after citing the example of an abuse 
of confidential information which shows the plaintiff “in a favourable 
light but gravely injures some relation or friend of his whom he wishes to 
protect”294 – and ultimately decided to leave the question open. Similarly, 
Lord Goff in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) also 
decided to “keep open the question whether detriment to the plaintiff is 
an essential ingredient of an action for breach of confidence”,295 although 
Lord Griffiths was of the opinion that “detriment, or potential detriment 
to the confider, is an element that must be established before a private 
individual is entitled to the remedy [of an injunction]”.296 Over in Australia 
(where it appears that the position remains open), Gummow J in Smith 
Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of 
Community Services and Health297 was of the view thus:298
The obligation of conscience is to respect the confidence, not merely to refrain 
from causing detriment to the plaintiff. The plaintiff comes to equity to vindicate 
his right to observance of the obligation, not necessarily to recover loss or to 
restrain infliction of apprehended loss. [emphasis added]
103 In the local case of Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd v Obegi Melissa,299 
Andrew Ang J in the High Court cited an example that was raised in 
academic commentary to illustrate why detriment may not always be 
necessary in breach of confidence scenarios:300
[O]ne situation (where detriment is not required) may be between a doctor and 
a celebrity patient suffering from AIDS. The authors opine that any intimate 
294 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 48. Cf Prince Albert v Strange 
(1849) 2 De G & SM 293 at 312: “Everyone, however, has a right, I apprehend, to say 
that the produce of his private hours is not more liable to publication without his 
consent, because the publication must be creditable or advantageous to him, than it 
would be in opposite circumstances” [emphasis added].
295 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281–282. 
Similar views were expressed by Lord Keith in Attorney-General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 256.
296 See Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 270.
297 (1990) 17 IPR 545.
298 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of 
Community Services and Health (1990) 17 IPR 545 at 584.
299 [2006] 3 SLR(R) 573.
300 Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd v Obegi Melissa [2006] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [73], citing Roger 
G Toulson & Charles M Phipps, Confidentiality (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at p 72. 
Andrew Ang J went on to say (at [75]): “The circumstances of the case before me 
are such that to insist upon proof of detriment will send a wrong signal encouraging 
vigilantism.”
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details revealed in confidence by the patient to the doctor ought to be respected 
even after his death although it cannot be said that the deceased will suffer any 
detriment from the publication, and thus the estate should be able to obtain an 
injunction to enforce the obligation.
Finally, it has also been pointed out in Gurry on Breach of Confidence 
that:301
… it is possible to conceive of cases (other than Megarry J’s example [in Coco]) 
where no real detriment is suffered. In the case of technical secrets, there is no 
requirement that the information be used in order to compete with the claimant 
(and thus to cause him direct economic detriment in that sense) and so in such 
a case it might be suggested that there is liability without any real detriment.
From the foregoing account, the weight of judicial and academic 
authority appears to cast doubt on the element of “detriment” as a formal 
prerequisite under the third limb of the Coco formulation. Indeed, Ang J 
was firmly of the view that “there are at least some situations where the 
insistence upon the presence of detriment would be inappropriate if not 
unjust”.302 The authors agree entirely with these perspectives.
104 When the requirement of “misuse” in the third stage of the Coco 
test is properly understood, it is apparent that there is no need for the 
plaintiff to be put to strict proof of detriment – if, by this, the plaintiff 
is required to establish that he has openly suffered economic damage as 
a result of the defendant’s unfair trade practices – even in cases where the 
plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest has been compromised. As explained 
above,303 the main focus of the plaintiff ’s wrongful gain interest is on the 
conduct of the defendant who must be shown to have wrongfully gained/
benefited from the misuse at the plaintiff ’s expense. Obviously, this sort 
of “unjust enrichment” may occur even where there is no direct evidence 
of economic harm or any prejudice suffered by the plaintiff.
105 Separately, but relatedly, the thinking that proof of actual misuse 
of confidential information on the part of the defendant is required 
in breach of confidence actions may well have arisen because of the 
perceived need to prove “detriment”, a point already addressed above.304 
The argument goes that unless the defendant has actually misused 
confidential information, the plaintiff will not be able to prove that he 
301 See Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence – The Protection of Confidential 
Information (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2012) at para 15.43.
302 Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd v Obegi Melissa [2006] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [70].
303 See para 38 above.
304 See paras 102–104 above.
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has suffered any detriment as a consequence.305 Such an argument may, in 
fact, have led the Court of Appeal in I-Admin to form the mistaken view 
that “[t]he requirement of unauthorised use and detriment has held back 
the development of the law by overemphasising the wrongful gain interest 
at the expense of the wrongful loss interest”.306 It is submitted at once that 
this approach does not represent the state of the law. So much is clear 
from Lord Griffith’s dicta in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers 
Ltd (No 2) where his Lordship expressed the view that “detriment, or 
potential detriment to the confider, is an element that must be established 
before a private individual is entitled to the remedy” [emphasis added].307
106 In any event, this question of “potential use” (or “potential 
detriment” for that matter) has been exhaustively examined, in obiter, 
by Lee Seiu Kin J in Clearlab.308 The principal concern in this case was 
to restrain the defendants, who were proven to have wrongfully used 
some of the plaintiff ’s confidential information, from committing further 
breaches of confidence in respect of a whole lot of remaining information 
and documents that they had wrongfully obtained. In deciding to 
leave the question open as to whether the mere taking of confidential 
information (in the absence of actual use or disclosure) can constitute 
a breach of confidence, Lee J nevertheless took the opportunity to review 
the authorities in Australia and the UK on the question of “threatened” 
misuse.
107 His Honour helpfully pointed out that the Australian courts have 
explicitly moved away from the concept that actual use or disclosure 
(or  “misuse” by the authors’ definition) was required to establish 
a breach of confidence. Instead, the courts now embrace the notion of 
a “threatened” misuse/abuse of confidential information.309 In relation to 
305 See also Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [199]:
[M]any of the cases on breach of confidence are grounded on past unauthorised 
use or disclosure. Based on the consistent emphasis of breach being actual use 
or disclosure, and the vintage of Coco’s formulation of the element of breach 
as ‘an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it’ …, the opposing argument is that the defendants should 
not be liable if they are not actually shown to have used the confidential 
information.
306 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [58].
307 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 270.
308 Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163.
309 See Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [201], citing Moorgate 
Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 438; Smith Kline & 
French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services 
and Health (1990) 22 FCR 73 at 87; (1990) 17 IPR 545 at 593; and AZPA Pty Ltd v 
Dogan [2010] VSC 51 at [10]. See also Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game 
Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 at 222 as well as I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v 
Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [59].
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English authorities, Lee J unsurprisingly relied on Lord Neuberger MR’s 
decision in Imerman for the proposition that a “threat” by the defendant 
to use or disclose confidential information (that is, “imminent use or 
disclosure”) appeared to be good enough for equity to intervene.310
108 On the facts in Clearlab, the defendants were found to have 
wrongfully used some of the plaintiff ’s confidential information and 
also taken thousands of documents belonging to the plaintiff – such 
conduct, additionally, being in “flagrant breach of contract”.311 Against 
this backdrop of proven (and multiple) instances of breach/misuse, it was 
not difficult for Lee J to form the view that the defendants’ (especially 
future) conduct clearly satisfied the threshold of a “threatened” misuse.312 
But the same cannot be said of the facts and state of the evidence in 
I-Admin where the trial judge (Abdullah J) had made the express finding 
that the defendant’s conduct, on the whole, was comparatively “not so 
egregious”.313 In other words, it was found that there was neither actual 
nor threatened misuse of confidential information in I-Admin (HC). 
This therefore suggests that whether or not there has been a breach of 
the plaintiff ’s confidence because of the defendant’s misuse ultimately 
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
109 There are some further observations on “threatened” misuse. 
Apart from the Imerman decision,314 several other English authorities 
have also adopted the language of “threatened” misuse (or any of its 
variants). This only goes to show that the third Coco requirement 
was never intended to be confined only to instances of “actual” use or 
disclosure without consent. Here are three additional examples in the 
case law:
(a) In deciding whether the defendant had “threatened” 
to breach a duty of confidence, the court held that “for present 
purposes, if the first two elements [of the Coco test] are satisfied, 
threatened unauthorised use would constitute a threat to the 
integrity of the 11+ exams and thereby be detrimental” [emphasis 
added].315
310 See Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [202]–[203].
311 Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [206]. See also [197].
312 See Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [206]–[207]. See also 
I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [29].
313 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [125]. See also 
[124].
314 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [69], [71] and 
[72].
315 Warwickshire County Council v Matalia [2018] EWHC 1340 (Ch) at [45], 
per Judge Simon Barker QC.
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(b) “Whether a publication, or threatened publication, 
involves a breach of a relationship of confidence, an interference 
with privacy or both, it is necessary to consider whether these 
matters justify the interference with Article 10 rights that will 
be involved if the publication is made the subject of a judicial 
sanction” [emphasis added].316
(c) “If the information in question can fairly be regarded 
as a separate part of the employee’s stock of knowledge which 
a man of ordinary honesty and intelligence would recognise to 
be the property of his old employer and not his own to do as 
he likes with, then the court, if it thinks that there is a danger of 
the information being used by the ex-employee to the detriment 
of the old employer will do what it can to prevent the result by 
granting an injunction” [emphasis added].317
110 It should further be mentioned that the notion of “threatened” – 
as opposed to “actual” – misuse is also to be found in breach of confidence/
invasion of (informational) privacy cases in England that were concerned 
with applications for interim or interlocutory injunctions.318 In the 
fairly recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in PJS v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd,319 Lord Mance expressed the view that “whether an 
interim injunction should be granted to restrain an anticipated tortious 
invasion of privacy raises different considerations from those involved in 
the simple question whether disclosure or publication would constitute 
a tortious act” [emphasis added].
(2) Reformulating the third Coco requirement and the suggested 
approach for the breach of confidence action
111 In what manner then should the third Coco requirement be 
modified? Given the arguments above320 that the “threatened” misuse 
concept is very much alive and well in other jurisdictions (such as the UK 
and Australia) and there is no sensible need for the defendant’s misuse 
to amount to “detriment” suffered by the plaintiff, a  reformulation of 
316 Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 at [65], 
per Lord Phillips CJ.
317 Printers & Finishers v Holloway [1965] RPC 239 at 255, per Cross J.
318 See, eg, Merryweather v Moore [1892] 2 Ch 518; G D Searle & Co Ltd v Celltech 
Ltd [1982] FSR 92; and McKenna Breen Ltd v James [2002] 6 WLUK 190; 
2002 WL 31422186. See also Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2005] 1 AC 253 and 
Caterpillar Logistics Services (UK) Ltd v Paula Huesca de Crean [2012] EWCA 
Civ 156; [2012] FSR 33.
319 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26; [2016] AC 1081 at [33].
320 See paras 105–110 above.
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the third limb of the Coco test by looking to the LVM (CA) decision for 
guidance is proposed.
112 In connection with an application for an injunction against 
a firm of solicitors321 and the related plea that the lawyer in question 
owed the applicant equitable obligations of confidentiality,322 the Court 
of Appeal, in disagreeing with the trial judge that there was a sufficient 
threat of misuse to justify the grant of an injunction,323 dealt with the 
Coco precedent in the following terms:324
In our view, a good starting-point would be the test for breach of confidence 
laid down by Megarry J in the seminal English High Court decision in Coco … 
albeit modified slightly having regard to the nature of the precise issue before 
this court and the relevant case law which will be considered briefly below. … 
Put simply, the counterparty in the previous set of proceedings [that is, the 
applicant] must establish that:
(a) the information concerned must have the necessary quality 
of confidence about it;
(b) that information must have been received by the lawyer 
(or law firm) concerned in circumstances importing an obligation of 
confidence; and
(c) there is a real and sensible possibility of the information 
being misused.
[emphasis in original]
113 There may be a certain desire to restrain lawyers in possession of 
information impressed with an obligation of confidentiality from acting 
(for a different party in subsequent proceedings) due simply to the risk/
possibility of an accidental, “unconscious or subconscious misuse of the 
confidential information concerned”.325 However, Phang JA ruled that the 
third Coco requirement “entails that there must be evidence that there is a 
real and sensible possibility of the information concerned being misused in 
the subsequent proceedings” [emphasis added].326 His Honour observed 
that the “real and sensible possibility” test, which was said to be well 
321 To enjoin the lawyer concerned – who had intimate knowledge of the confidential 
terms of a settlement agreement entered into by litigants in a separate action – from 
acting for his client.
322 On the basis that there was a real risk that confidential information would be 
misused/disclosed if the law firm were not restrained from acting.
323 See Wan Hoe Keet v LVM Law Chambers LLC [2020] 3 SLR 568.
324 LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [15].
325 LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [19].
326 LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [21]. In the UK, the 
equivalent test in a similar context is that of a “real risk of prejudice”: see Glencairn 
IP Holdings Ltd v Product Specialities Inc [2020] EWCA Civ 609 at [69].
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established in the case law, must be applied on an “objective basis”327 – 
that is, through the perspective of “a  fair-minded reasonably informed 
member of the public”.328
114 Crucially, it would not have been acceptable to apply a legal test 
where the appearance of risk of misuse of the information concerned was 
“remote or merely fanciful”.329 In some instances, “the risk of misuse is 
patently obvious, such as where there is clear evidence of an intention to 
use information contrary to the obligation of confidence” but there might 
also be other instances where “the [real and sensible possibility] test could 
be satisfied by circumstances falling short of this high threshold”.330 But 
certainly, a mere “suspicion” of misuse will not do.331
115 For plaintiffs who bear the burden of establishing the misuse 
requirement in breach of confidence actions, what matters, in the final 
analysis, is the court’s holistic assessment of the weight to be accorded to 
all the evidence available, with the court having regard also to the facts 
and circumstances of the case at hand in order to ascertain whether there 
would be a real and sensible possibility of the confidential information 
being misused by the defendant. This is obviously a fact-sensitive 
inquiry (that typically involves the court’s drawing of inferences from the 
evidence) but it bears repeating that the legal burden of proof nevertheless 
falls squarely on the plaintiff.332
116 In the authors’ respectful view, the “real and sensible possibility” 
test propounded in LVM (CA) is an eminently sensible test to adopt in 
the proposed modification of the third Coco requirement. It echoes, in 
substance, the “threatened” misuse concept well entrenched in the law 
of confidence in the UK and Australia. The authors are also of the view 
that the “real and sensible possibility” test is of wider import than to be 
327 LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [21].
328 Citing Grimwade v Meagher [1995] 1 VR 446 at 455, per Mandie J.
329 LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [21], citing Carter 
Holt Harvey Forests Ltd v Sunnex Logging Ltd [2001] 3 NZLR 343 at [26]. Cf the 
threshold for “risk” adopted by Lord Neuberger MR in Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] 
EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [69] and [72].
330 LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [22].
331 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 at [27]: “I was not 
satisfied that the plaintiff ’s claims had been made out on the balance of probabilities. 
While there were perhaps strands of evidence that pointed to a suspicion of breaches 
by the defendants in the Suits, this was not enough to bring the plaintiff over the 
requisite evidential threshold.” See also Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte 
Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1045 at [181]: “The Plaintiff must still prove its case against the 
Defendants on a balance of probabilities. The fact that there exists a suspicion of 
access and copying is not enough.”
332 See LVM Law Chambers LLC v Wan Hoe Keet [2020] 1 SLR 1083 at [24].
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applied only to cases involving a litigant’s right to instruct/retain the 
lawyer of his choice. Indeed, there is no good reason why it cannot apply 
more generally to all breach of confidence cases.
117 In summary, the suggested approach for breach of confidence 
actions in Singapore entails proof by the plaintiff of all three elements 
of the Coco test. However, in  so  far as the third Coco requirement is 
concerned, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to establish either actual 
misuse of confidential information on the part of the defendant or that 
there is a real and sensible possibility of the information concerned being 
misused by the defendant. As has been argued above,333 there is no need 
for the plaintiff to further prove that the defendant’s alleged misuse had 
caused him any “detriment”.
118 Once the plaintiff has discharged this legal burden of proof, 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to raise potential defences – for 
example, that the misuse of confidential information on his part was 
justified in the public interest.334 It is noted, parenthetically, that although 
the overall legal burden of proof lies squarely on the plaintiff, the evidential 
burden may well shift as between the parties throughout the course of the 
proceedings,335 a point which has also been raised above.336
IV. A new cause of action for “misuse of private information”?
119 Although the authors do not agree with the application of the 
modified approach to breach of confidence actions in Singapore, the 
authors are of the respectful view that the analytical framework adopted 
by the Court of Appeal in I-Admin (that is, the raising of a presumption 
and shifting of the legal burden) can nevertheless play a useful role in 
the context of a new cause of action for “misuse of private information” 
which will now be proposed.
120 The starting point for this proposal must be the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in ANB v ANC.337 Arising from an application for an interlocutory 
injunction in the context of a family law dispute (not unlike the facts in 
333 See paras 102–104 above.
334 The reader will recall that this is also the third example provided by the Court 
of Appeal through which the defendant may be able to displace the prima facie 
presumption after the legal burden of proof has shifted to him: see I-Admin 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [61].
335 See Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 
at [58] ff. See also the discussion in Sim Poh Ping v Winsta Holding Pte Ltd [2020] 
1 SLR 1199.
336 See para 24 above.
337 [2015] 5 SLR 522.
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Imerman), the Court of Appeal made several obiter but tentative remarks 
on whether the law of confidence in Singapore should be extended, at 
some point in time, to also protect private/personal information that 
(on the facts) had been surreptitiously obtained.
121 Phang JA cautioned that under such factual circumstances, 
the rigid application of the Coco test “must be viewed with at least 
some circumspection”.338 Notwithstanding the absence of any express 
guarantee of the right to privacy under the Constitution of the Republic 
of Singapore,339 his Honour observed that legal developments elsewhere – 
for instance, through an extension of the breach of confidence action in 
the UK and a common law right to privacy in New Zealand – have clearly 
demonstrated the prowess of the common law to fill this lacuna in the 
protection of private/personal information.
122 Above all, it was also pointed out that recent legislative 
developments in Singapore – such as the enactment of the Personal Data 
Protection Act 2012340 and Protection from Harassment Act341 – may well 
have paved the way for similar developments under the common law. The 
authors respectfully agree with Phang JA that the time is indeed ripe for 
the Singapore courts to expressly and robustly recognise the need for the 
protection of informational privacy in Singapore.342
123 If the call for reform in this area of the law is sensible and 
accepted, how should Singapore fashion a common law cause of action 
for misuse of private information? As we know, the protection accorded to 
private/personal information in the UK appears, at least from the earlier 
decisions, to have been “shoe-horned” into the law of confidence,343 given 
the need for the English courts to give effect to the relevant provisions 
of the UK Human Rights Act 1998.344 This “shoe-horning” practice is 
also due, in large part, to the fact that there is no independent tort for 
338 ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 at [18].
339 1999 Reprint.
340 Act 26 of 2012.
341 Cap 256A, 2015 Rev Ed.
342 See also Re My Digital Lock Pte Ltd [2018] PDP Digest 334 at [35]  ff (especially 
at [40]).
343 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 at [96], 
per Lord Phillips MR. See also Lord Woolf CJ in A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337; 
[2003] QB 195 at [4] and Dingemans J in Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] 
EWHC  1163 (QB) at [36]; and see generally Nicole Moreham, “Privacy in the 
Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis” (2005) 121 LQR 628.
344 c 42. This piece of legislation, in turn, embraced the right to privacy enshrined in 
Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in addition to the Art 10 right 
to freedom of expression.
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the invasion of privacy in the English context.345 It is, of course, open to 
question whether such a “shoe-horning” practice still represents English 
law today in light of the decision of the UK Supreme Court in PJS v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd which appears to have treated the “tort of invasion 
of [informational] privacy” as having finally broken free from its roots in 
breach of confidence.346
124 Regardless of what the current judicial thinking is in the UK, 
it would be preferable not to base a legal claim for the misuse of private 
information on the juridical foundations of the “old fashioned” law of 
confidence. The reasons for this have already been canvassed above,347 
particularly in view of the importance of keeping the concepts of 
“privacy” and “confidentiality” distinct. For emphasis, Lord Nicholls’ 
advice in OBG Ltd v Allan is reiterated:348
As the law has developed, breach of confidence, or misuse of confidential 
information, now covers two distinct causes of action, protecting two different 
interests: privacy, and secret (‘confidential’) information. It is important to keep 
these two distinct. [emphasis added]
Pursuant to the proposed model, whereas the focus of the traditional 
action for breach of confidence is on preserving the “confidentiality” of the 
information concerned and the binding of the defendant’s “conscience” 
in equity via the imposition of the obligation of confidentiality, the 
standalone action to safeguard informational privacy focuses instead 
on the protection of private/personal information against (especially 
emotional and psychological) harm caused by the defendant’s conduct 
to an individual’s personal autonomy, dignity and self-esteem. It is 
respectfully submitted that the time has now come for the judges in 
Singapore – as “bold spirits” and not “timorous souls”349 – to recognise 
that the privacy of personal information is “something worthy of 
protection in its own right”.350
345 See Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 at [35] and Campbell v MGN Ltd 
[2004] 2 AC 457 at [43].
346 See PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26; [2016] AC 1081 at [25] ff. 
See also Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311.
347 See the discussion at paras 57–76 above.
348 OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [255]. Cf his Lordship’s dicta in Campbell v MGN 
Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [14] and see also Wade v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] 
EWCA Civ 1214 at [2], per Briggs LJ. See further Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 
at [48] and [246]; Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 at [25]; and PJS v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26; [2016] AC 1081.
349 Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 at 178, per Denning LJ (dissenting).
350 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [46], per Lord Hoffmann. See also the Law 
Commission of England and Wales (Law Com No 110), Breach of Confidence: Report 
on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Cmnd 8388, 
1981) at para 2.3: “By contrast, a right of privacy in respect of information would 
(cont’d on the next page)
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A. Juridical basis for this new cause of action
125 In order to distinguish this new cause of action from the 
traditional action for breach of confidence, it is clear – at least at the 
conceptual level  – that the juridical basis for the action for misuse of 
private information cannot lie in equity, for fear of violating the very 
principles upon which the breach of confidence action was founded 
(for example, to protect relationships of trust and confidence). It bears 
repeating that misuse of private information is an independent cause of 
action at common law that does not import the customary indicia of 
a duty of confidence.
126 Instead, the authors would like to pay deference to Lord Nicholls’ 
speech in Campbell where his Lordship expressed the view that the 
“essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private 
information” [emphasis added].351 Prima facie, there does not appear to 
be any harm in classifying the extended action for breach of confidence/
misuse of private information as a “tort” in the English context given that 
it is but a subset of a much broader and general tort of invasion of privacy 
(had the existence of this latter tort been accepted in the authorities).352
127 In Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3),353 Lord Phillips MR was of 
the view that “[t]he Douglases’ claim in relation to invasion of their 
privacy might seem most appropriately to fall within the ambit of the 
law of delict”, but “that the effect of shoe-horning this type of claim into 
the cause of action of breach of confidence means that it does not fall 
to be treated as a tort under English law”.354 It is abundantly clear that 
Lord Phillips MR would have had no hesitation in treating the cause of 
action for breach of informational privacy as a “tort” under English law 
but for the fact that this sort of claim had, in his obiter opinion,355 already 
been “shoe-horned” into the “equitable” action for breach of confidence. 
Eady J in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd356 has also acknowledged 
arise from the nature of the information itself: it would be based on the principle 
that certain kinds of information are categorised as private and for that reason alone 
ought not to be disclosed.”
351 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [14].
352 See Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 at [35] and Campbell v MGN Ltd 
[2004] 2 AC 457 at [43].
353 [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125.
354 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 at [96]. Cf also 
Lord Phillips MR’s dicta in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1373; [2003] 
QB 633 at [61] where his Lordship referred to the “protection of privacy by expanding 
the scope of breach of confidence” as a “tort”.
355 See Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 at [38].
356 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB).
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that (leading) “textbooks dealing with the law of tort … do address the 
subject as being within their remit”.357
128 Crucially, a survey of the relevant jurisprudence clearly suggests 
that the action for misuse of private information in the UK ought rightly 
to be characterised as a “tort”.358 As the English Court of Appeal aptly 
observed in Google Inc v Vidal-Hall:359
… [m]isuse of private information is a civil wrong without any equitable 
characteristics. We do not need to attempt to define a tort here. But if one puts 
aside the circumstances of its ‘birth’, there is nothing in the nature of the claim 
itself to suggest that the more natural classification of it as a tort is wrong.
129 The UK Supreme Court in its fairly recent decision in PJS v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd also referred to the claim for misuse of private 
information as being based on the “tort of invasion of privacy”.360 On 
balance, therefore, the authors are of the view that it is legally permissible 
to label the proposed cause of action at common law as the “tort” of 
misuse of private information.361
B. Analytical framework and requirements for the new tort of 
“misuse of private information”
130 By gratefully drawing on the modified approach in I-Admin 
(CA) as well as taking guidance from the decision of the House of Lords 
in Campbell, this is how the authors envision the new common law tort 
in Singapore for the “misuse of private information”. However, before 
setting out the analytical framework and constituent elements for the 
new tort, some substantive differences between the approach that will be 
proposed for Singapore and the contemporary position under English law 
(on the scope of the expanded cause of action for breach of confidence/
infringement of informational privacy) will be highlighted.
131 First, it is stating the obvious that Singapore is not bound by the 
provisions in the ECHR; therefore, the proposed cause of action does not 
involve the court’s balancing of competing Convention rights (typically 
357 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) at [181].
358 See, eg, McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714; [2008] QB 73 at [11]; Lord Browne 
of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] QB 103 at [21]–[22]; Murray v 
Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446; [2009] Ch 481 at [24]; Google Inc v 
Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 at [21], [43] and [51].
359 Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 at [43].
360 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26; [2016] AC 1081 at [32].
361 In further support of this proposition, see Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA 
Civ 311 at [51].
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those embodied in Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR).362 Second, while it is 
helpful to adopt the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test propounded 
by their Lordships in Campbell for the purposes of the new tort, it 
should be emphasised at this juncture that the application of this test will 
necessarily be different in the local context. This is explained below.
132 Apart from having to establish a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” (or “legitimate expectation of protection”)363 in relation to 
the matter of complaint at stage 1 of the enquiry in England, it is also 
incumbent on the claimant to prove – so as to engage Art 8 of the ECHR 
and trigger the obligation of confidentiality (because of the shoe-horning 
effect, recognised at least in the earlier cases) – that the alleged defendant 
knows or ought to know that the claimant had a reasonable expectation 
that the information concerned would remain private (or “knows or 
ought to know” that there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy”).364
133 In the local context, however, the sole enquiry should be whether 
the information in question is private/personal in nature, the relevant test 
for which is also proof of a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. Crucially, 
in order to discharge the legal burden of proof, there is no need for the 
plaintiff to also establish that the defendant did possess either actual or 
imputed knowledge that the information concerned was private. This 
must necessarily be the right approach to take for Singapore once it is 
appreciated that (a) a right of privacy in respect of information will arise 
from the very nature of the information itself and be protected by the 
new tort on that basis (and for that reason) alone; and (b) misuse of 
private information in the local context is truly an independent cause of 
action that is uncluttered by any limitations deriving from the equitable, 
362 For a recent exposition of the English position on the “balancing exercise” or 
“proportionality test” that courts must undertake at stages 1 and 2 of the enquiry, 
see ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611 at [46].
363 According to Simon LJ in ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611 at [46], the 
two tests are “synonymous”.
364 See Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [85] and [134]; Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
(No  3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 at [82]; A v B plc [2002] EWCA 
Civ 337; [2003] QB 195 at [11(ix)]; and Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] 
EWHC 1163 (QB) at [36]–[38]. See also Nicole Moreham, “Privacy in the Common 
Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis” (2005) 121 LQR 628 at 631–632. It is, 
however, questionable whether such knowledge is still relevant to the assessment 
at stage 1 of the enquiry today in light of the decision of the UK Supreme Court in 
PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26; [2016] AC 1081 which appears 
to have treated the “tort of invasion of [informational] privacy” as having finally 
broken free from its roots in breach of confidence (at [25] ff); and see also Google 
Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311.
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conscience-based origins of the “old fashioned” action for breach of 
confidence.365
134 With these considerations in mind, the authors respectfully set 
out the approach that should be taken in relation to the proposed tort for 
“misuse of private information”. First, the legal burden falls squarely on 
the plaintiff to prove – on an objective basis – that he has a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in respect of the information concerned.366 
In applying this test, “there must be an objective assessment of what 
a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if he or she were 
placed in the same position as the claimant and faced with the same 
publicity”.367 Helpfully, Sir Anthony Clarke MR in Murray v Express 
Newspapers plc provided the following (non-exhaustive) list of factors 
that might be relevant in determining whether a reasonable expectation 
of privacy is established on the facts:368
the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the claimant 
was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of 
the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be 
inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the 
purposes for which the information came into the hands of the [defendant].
Reference may also be usefully made to the following observations by 
Gleeson CJ in the High Court of Australia in Australian Broadcasting 
Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd:369
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private and what is 
not. Use of the term ‘public’ is often a convenient method of contrast, but there 
is a large area in between what is necessarily public and what is necessarily 
private. An activity is not private simply because it is not done in public. It does 
not suffice to make an act private that, because it occurs on private property, 
it has such measure of protection from the public gaze as the characteristics 
of the property, the nature of the activity, the locality, and the disposition of 
the property owner combine to afford. Certain kinds of information about 
365 See generally Nicole Moreham, “Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and 
Theoretical Analysis” (2005) 121 LQR 628.
366 Cf Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 (“Campbell”) at [21], [85] and [134]–[135]. 
Significantly, Lord Nicholls in [21] referred to a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
as the “touchstone of private life”. It should also be noted that their Lordships in 
Campbell clearly preferred the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to the 
somewhat stricter test suggested by Gleeson CJ of what private information is in 
Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 1 at [42] 
(namely, whether “disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities”).
367 ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611 at [43], per Simon LJ, referring to 
Lord Hope’s dicta in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [99].
368 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446; [2009] Ch 481 at [36].
369 Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 1 at [42].
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a person, such as information relating to health, personal relationships, or 
finances, may be easy to identify as private; as may certain kinds of activity, 
which a reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of morals and 
behaviour, would understand to be meant to be unobserved.
135 Once the plaintiff has discharged the legal burden of proof (that 
there is a “reasonable expectation” that the information in question will be 
kept private), a prima facie presumption of misuse of private information 
arises in the plaintiff ’s favour.
136 The legal burden then shifts to the defendant to displace this 
presumption. For example, the defendant may be able to adduce evidence 
to show that although he has come upon – or is now in possession of – the 
information without consent (whether as an indirect recipient, accidental 
finder or surreptitious taker of information):
(a) he had no actual or constructive knowledge that the 
information concerned was private in nature (or that the plaintiff 
had a reasonable expectation that the information concerned 
would remain private); or
(b) there was a legitimate public interest in his access to and/
or possession of such information.
Notably, this new cause of action – unlike other property-based torts 
such as trespass, conversion and infringement of copyright – does not 
take on the complexion of a strict liability tort.
137 Finally, because of the potential overlaps in the two causes of 
action (namely, the traditional breach of confidence action and the tort for 
misuse of private information), it is suggested that a plaintiff who initiates 
proceedings for the infringement of informational privacy ought to be 
able to avail himself of the same suite of remedies as someone who seeks 
relief for “old fashioned” breach of confidence.370 Apart from the familiar 
remedy of an injunction, it appears that damages (and even aggravated 
damages where appropriate) are also available as compensation for the 
misuse of private information.371
370 It is envisaged that in so far as the tort for misuse of private information is concerned, 
the primary remedy sought will be that of an injunction: see Megarry  J’s dicta in 
Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 50 (“If the duty is a duty not 
to use the information without consent, then it may be the proper subject of an 
injunction restraining its use, even if there is an offer to pay a reasonable sum for 
that use.”). A deeper consideration and more extensive discussion of the whole area 
of remedies is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article.
371 See Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB) at [192].
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138 There are three further observations to be made regarding the 
proposed tort for “misuse of private information”. First, it is important 
to point out that the protection afforded to private/personal information 
by the new tort is comparatively broader in scope than that provided by 
the traditional law of confidence (as exemplified in Coco) as well as the 
modified approach in I-Admin (CA). As highlighted above,372 the new tort 
focuses squarely on the protection of private/personal information and 
does not, strictly speaking, protect the claimant’s confidentiality interests 
in the information concerned. To further elucidate the differences 
in the scope of protection afforded to private/personal information 
and confidential information by the two respective causes of action, 
Lord Nicholls’ observations in OBG Ltd v Allan bear repeating for their 
instructive value:373
In some instances information may qualify for protection both on grounds 
of privacy and confidentiality. In other instances information may be in the 
public domain, and not qualify for protection as confidential, and yet qualify 
for protection on the grounds of privacy. Privacy can be invaded by further 
publication of information or photographs already disclosed to the public.
139 This therefore suggests that private/personal information may, 
in appropriate circumstances, be more resilient and resistant to public 
exposure than in the case of confidential commercial information. In 
other words, a piece of private information may well retain its “private” 
character even after its release into the public domain374 and it appears 
that this is particularly true where photographs are concerned.375 This 
may explain why informational privacy justly deserves a broader and 
more robust scope of protection under the common law, through an 
independent cause of action which goes further than the protection 
currently afforded to private/personal information by the traditional law 
of confidence as well as the modified approach in I-Admin (CA).
140 Second, in applying this analytical framework to the new tort, 
it is apparent that there is no need for the plaintiff, in establishing 
a  breach of informational privacy, to prove that the defendant has 
made (or  threatened to make) an unauthorised use or disclosure of 
the protected information. This is clearly in line with the thesis of this 
372 See paras 124 and 133 above.
373 OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [255]. See also Re My Digital Lock Pte Ltd [2018] 
PDP Digest 334 at [35]: “The key development in this tort is, to my mind, the 
availability of remedies even where the private communication does not have the 
necessary quality of confidence, which had hitherto been the death knell to any 
action based on the breach of confidentiality”.
374 See PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26; [2016] AC 1081.
375 See Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 at [84] ff and 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [75].
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article since the defendant’s unauthorised access to and/or possession of 
private/personal information per se – on account of, inter alia, the level 
of distress and/or embarrassment caused to the plaintiff – is sufficient to 
compromise the privacy rights of the latter in respect of the information 
concerned. It is observed, parenthetically, that the question of misuse 
under English law and, in particular, the equivalent action for misuse of 
private information still remains unresolved because it is by no means 
clear that the reservations expressed by Lord Neuberger MR in Imerman – 
on whether there is any need for “such misuse before a claim for breach of 
confidentiality can succeed”376 – have been unequivocally and universally 
endorsed by the English courts in subsequent breach of confidence/
invasion of informational privacy cases. In the local context, however, 
if the tort for misuse of private information is indeed recognised by the 
courts as an actionable wrong in its own right, then, despite its name, it is 
submitted that there does not have to be “such misuse” before a claim can 
succeed.
141 Finally, it must be emphasised that in proposing this new tort 
of misuse of private information, the authors are in no way advocating 
a  “blockbuster” common law tort to protect against the invasion of 
privacy generally – or what Lord Nicholls described as an “over-arching, 
all-embracing cause of action for ‘invasion of privacy’”.377 Although case 
law developments in New Zealand appear to have been more promising 
in the field of privacy (first, in the guise of an independent common law 
tort of invasion of privacy that was recognised in Hosking v Runting,378 
376 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [71].
377 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [11]. It may be usefully noted that Andrew 
Phang Boon Leong JA’s allusion to a “common law right to privacy” in ANB v ANC 
[2015] 5 SLR 522 at [22] could not have been in relation to this “over-arching, 
all-embracing cause of action for ‘invasion of privacy’”. Indeed, such a “blockbuster” 
tort had itself been categorically rejected by the House of Lords in Wainwright v 
Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 at [35] and Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 
at [43]. Instead, it is suggested that Phang JA was likely referring to a common 
law action to safeguard informational privacy within the framework of the law of 
confidence: see ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 at [23].
378 See Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [246]:
Breach of confidence, being an equitable concept, is conscience-based. 
Invasion of privacy is a common law wrong which is founded on the harm 
done to the plaintiff by conduct which can reasonably be regarded as offensive 
to human values. While it may be possible to achieve the same substantive 
result by developing the equitable cause of action [for breach of confidence], 
I consider it legally preferable and better for society’s understanding of what 
the Courts are doing to achieve the appropriate substantive outcome under 
a self-contained and stand-alone common law cause of action to be known as 
invasion of privacy.
 See also [117] for the two fundamental requirements for a successful claim for 
interference with privacy: (a) the existence of facts in respect of which there is a 
(cont’d on the next page)
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followed by incremental changes to the law in subsequent cases before 
culminating in the adoption of a separate tort of “intrusion upon 
seclusion” in C v Holland),379 the authors remain somewhat sceptical of 
its evolution in the local context. Given that this “blockbuster” concept 
had been categorically rejected by the House of Lords in the UK many 
years ago,380 the authors are of the view that this is probably a matter best 
left to Parliament.381
V. Conclusion
142 Granted, the facts in I-Admin intuitively leave one with the sense 
that some wrong has occurred, and that this wrong must be put right. 
The Court of Appeal hinted as much through its rhetorical proclamation: 
“[i]n such circumstances, why should the courts not have the power to 
grant relief ”?382 Although the remedial outcome in I-Admin (CA) seems 
fair, how this was achieved reflects the extent to which the domestic law 
of confidence had been contorted in order to fashion a remedy for the 
plaintiff. On the other hand, the so-called challenges faced by I-Admin 
(the plaintiff) in this suit may well have been overstated. For instance, it 
may be posited that relief was always available for copyright infringement; 
the plaintiff simply decided to pitch its case too “high”.383
143 In any event, the court’s modified approach fails, with respect, 
to accord sufficient sensitivity to the conceptual premise undergirding 
each stage of the old Coco framework, in particular the specific interests 
protected by the obligation of confidentiality and the element of 
reasonable expectation of privacy; and (b) publicity given to those private facts that 
would be considered highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.
379 C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672. See also Re My Digital Lock Pte Ltd [2018] PDP 
Digest 334 at [28] ff (especially at [34]).
380 See Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 at [35] and Campbell v MGN Ltd 
[2004] 2 AC 457 at [43].
381 See generally Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (especially at 66).
382 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [43].
383 The plaintiff in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 3 SLR 615 
(HC); [2020] 1 SLR 1130 (CA) would presumably have been entitled to a remedy for 
infringement of copyright had it decided to pursue a different litigation strategy. On 
the facts, there was clear evidence that the defendants had downloaded, possessed 
and circulated unauthorised copies of the plaintiff ’s materials. However, this “lower 
level” claim of copyright infringement was not meaningfully pursued before the trial 
judge, which therefore led the apex court to reject this claim on appeal – observing 
in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [35] that 
“had that alternative case been signposted, the trial would have proceeded quite 
differently”, with the question of infringement “resolved simply by examining what 
materials were in the [defendants’] possession and where those materials came 
from”.
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unauthorised use. The new framework also appears to have been heavily 
influenced by foreign, and in particular English, jurisprudence, the latter 
of which has had a long (but unhelpful) history of conflating the distinct 
concepts of “privacy” and “confidentiality”.
144 Going forward, it would be prudent to distinguish between these 
two unhappy bedfellows, such that each may, particularly in distinct 
circumstances, attain the desired degree of protection that it rightly 
deserves. To that end, the authors suggest that the time has now come 
for the Singapore courts to boldly advance the law and recognise that 
informational privacy is a human value that has always been worthy of 
independent protection. The law of confidence in Singapore will, until 
then, simply have to amble along, with privacy interests uncomfortably 
in tow.
145 The authors have one parting thought on I-Admin (CA). As 
mentioned, it is clear that the sympathies of the Court of Appeal lay 
with I-Admin, the former employer.384 The authors also allude to the 
possibility that the court, on the facts of this litigation, may have deemed 
the defendant former employees (in particular, Hong and Liu) – being 
surreptitious takers of confidential information belonging to I-Admin – 
as wrongdoers385 “by virtue of [their] unconscionable conduct”.386 Indeed, 
such a perspective calls to mind what Hoffmann J (as he then was) had 
to say in Lock International plc v Beswick:387 “Some employers seem to 
regard competition from former employees as presumptive evidence of 
dishonesty”.388 Through this article, the authors have sought to impress 
upon the reader that the Court of Appeal’s modified approach taken in 
relation to the law of confidence – for a variety of (mostly doctrinal) 
reasons – may not have been the most appropriate tool to regulate (and 
perhaps deter) such post-employment conduct and address predicaments 
of this nature. There is one other important explanation for this.
146 Although it is widely acknowledged that there is “lingering 
uncertainty” over the conceptual basis of the action to protect confidential 
information,389 it is also widely accepted that information per se is not 
property and the law has generally refused to recognise a property right 
384 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [55] and [62].
385 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [64] 
(“this does not absolve the respondents from wrongdoing”).
386 I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [71].
387 [1989] 3 All ER 373.
388 Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373 at 383.
389 See Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1045 at [129]. 
A more detailed discussion of the debate surrounding the various doctrinal bases for 
the breach of confidence action is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article.
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(or a right in rem) in pure ideas and information.390 Accordingly, it is 
imperative that extreme caution be exercised before attempts are made to 
(a) elevate the status of confidential information (or information generally) 
to that of property; as well as (b) suggest that the mere unauthorised 
taking, retention and/or referencing of the plaintiff ’s confidential 
information would be sufficient – in the absence of any further misuse 
by the defendant – to give rise to liability (or a presumption of liability) 
under the equitable framework for the law of confidence. In this regard, it 
has been perceptively observed (and the authors respectfully agree) that 
“[i]f confidential information does not create proprietary rights, then the 
mere fact of a [surreptitious] taking cannot be a ground for liability”.391
147 Relevantly, as against the equitable action for breach of 
confidence with fairly malleable notions for imposing liability and 
where the grant of relief ultimately remains discretionary, there are 
alternative causes of action (with stronger juridical and conceptual 
underpinnings) that an employer can rely upon if its former employee(s) 
were to clandestinely purloin the company’s confidential information. 
This strategy is particularly apposite in respect of areas of the law which 
do not require a court’s judicious balancing of competing interests, 
such as those between ex-employers and ex-employees. Some examples 
of these alternative causes of action include conversion,392 trespass to 
goods/chattels,393 wrongful interference with property394 and copyright 
infringement (already alluded to above),395 in addition to the use of the 
criminal law for offences like theft and against cybercrime and/or other 
forms of computer crime under the Computer Misuse Act.396
390 See, eg, Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 at 127–128, per Lord Upjohn (“In general, 
information is not property at all. … But in the end the real truth is that it is not 
property in any normal sense but Equity will restrain its transmission to another if in 
breach of some confidential relationship”); OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [275]; 
Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2012] 
EWHC 616 (Ch) at [376]; Phillips v Mulcaire [2013] 1 AC 1 at [27] (Lord Walker 
expressed the view, in obiter, that confidential private/personal information is not 
strictly “intellectual property”); and Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 
1 SLR 163 at [85] and [308]. See also Seager v Copydex Ltd (No 2) [1969] 1 WLR 809 
at 813 where Lord Denning MR referred to “property” in confidential information 
only “so far as there is property in it”.
391 George Wei, “Surreptitious Takings of Confidential Information” (1992) 12 Legal 
Studies 302 at 305.
392 See, eg, Tat Seng Machine Movers Pte Ltd v Orix Leasing Singapore Ltd [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 1101 at [45]; OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [95] and [308]; and White v 
Withers LLP [2009] EWCA Civ 1122 at [51]–[52].
393 See, eg, White v Withers LLP [2009] EWCA Civ 1122.
394 See, eg, White v Withers LLP [2008] EWHC 2821 (QB); [2009] EWCA Civ 1122.
395 See I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [30]–[35], 
[55] and [65].
396 Cap 50A, 2007 Rev Ed.
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148 Indeed, it is only when one has property rights to a thing (or res) 
that one has locus standi to exclude others from interfering with such 
rights (such as for being in unlawful possession of the thing in question). 
However, in so far as confidential information is concerned, the plaintiff 
may, in equity, only be able to prevent/remedy a breach of his confidence 
after the defendant’s threatened/actual misuse of the information in 
question.397 In this connection, the learned authors of Gurry on Breach of 
Confidence have also pointed out that access to, acquisition, retention and/
or referencing of confidential information entail acts by the defendant 
that constitute “novel forms of breach” – falling outside the classic acts of 
unauthorised use or disclosure – and “appear to be more redolent of other 
causes of action such as copyright (‘retaining or supplying copies’) or even 
trespass (‘looking at’)” [emphasis added].398
149 In closing, Imerman remains a difficult decision (despite the 
attempted rationalisation above)399 because “it suggests a wider basis 
for liability than had been suggested by previous authorities on breach 
of confidence”.400 I-Admin (CA) will likewise generate its fair share of 
controversy. Yet, it is the authors’ fervent hope that this article will make 
a  timely and meaningful contribution to the anticipated debate and, 
more importantly, serve as a sensible catalyst for legal reform in the near 
future – no less in a post-pandemic Singapore!
397 Contra Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] 2 WLR 592 at [69] and 
I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting [2020] 1 SLR 1130 at [63]–[66].
398 See Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence – The Protection of Confidential 
Information (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2012) at paras 15.18 and 15.21.
399 See paras 82–95 above (especially para 86).
400 Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence – The Protection of Confidential 
Information (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2012) at para 15.23.
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